Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 32 | Number 3

Article 1

1-1-1992

Rethinking the Proportional Reduction Rule in the
Settlement of Multiparty Securities Actions:
Judicial Overreaching or a Neat Solution?
Christine B. Hickman

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christine B. Hickman, Rethinking the Proportional Reduction Rule in the Settlement of Multiparty Securities Actions: Judicial Overreaching
or a Neat Solution?, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 649 (1992).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

ARTICLES

RETHINKING THE PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION
RULE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF MULTIPARTY
SECURITIES ACTIONS: JUDICIAL OVERREACHING
OR A NEAT SOLUTION?
Christine B. Hickman*
I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The private rights of action.
B. The right to contribution.
C. Two trends in modern law.
1. The trend toward a fair allocation of damages among joint tortfeasors.
2. The trend toward partial settlement of complex securities cases.
D. The conflict between the trends.
E. A solution: settlement bar statutes.
F. The Securities Acts contain no specific means for
reconciling the competing trends.
G. The Ninth Circuit experience.
1. The Laventhol case.
2. Smith v. Mulvaney.
3. District court cases.
H. The Kaypro solution.
THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: DO COURTS
HAVE THE COMMON LAW POWER TO CREATE
A SETTLEMENT BAR RULE?
A. The traditional bases for creation of federal common law.
B. The Texas Industries case.
C. The Texas Industries analysis of the bases for federal common law powers.
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A settlement bar rule does not involve any
uniquely federal interests.
2. There is no evidence of congressional intent
sufficient to empower courts to create a
settlement bar rule.
D. Authority to create settlement bar rules may arise
from the court's interstitial powers.
1. The statute of limitations cases.
E. The authority to extinguish contribution rights
may depend on whether those rights are statutorily created or judicially implied.
F. A settlement bar entered under the pro tanto rule
involves a greater use of judicial power than one
entered under the proportional reduction rule.
G. The applicability of state law.
1. Federal courts must use state law to fill in
interstices in federal statutes, unless a
uniform national rule is necessary.
2. Justice Scalia's approach suggests that state
settlement bar rules should be applied.
3. The Rules of Decision Act.
H. The choice of a settlement bar rule is a decision
that should be made by Congress.
THE MERITS OF THE PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION RULE
A. Deterrence.
1. Deterrence to Major Participants.
(a) The Proportional Reduction Rule.
(b) The Pro Tanto Rule.
2. Deterrence to Minor Participants.
(a) The Proportional Reduction Rule.
(b) The Pro Tanto Rule.
3. The pro tanto system threatens minor participants with huge liability.
(a) The Nucorp example.
4. The effects of insolvency.
5. The effects of insurance.
6. Efficiency.
7. Deterrence and retribution.
B. The proportional reduction rule discourages
settlement.
1. The settling defendant.
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The non-settling defendant.
The plaintiff.
(a) Plaintiffs will hesitate to settle claims
which are difficult to estimate.
(b) Settlement with impecunious defendants
or for policy limits will be severely discouraged.
(c) Delay of settlement.
(d) Empirical evidence.
4. Class action settlements may be discouraged.
5. Methods to neutralize risk for the plaintiff.
C. The proportional reduction rule does not promote judicial economy.
1. Elimination of the good faith hearing.
2. Pendent claims.
D. The proportional reduction rule places heavy
burdens on the plaintiff.
1. Plaintiffs are deprived of settlement leverage.
2. Jury confusion and prejudice to plaintiff.
3. Problems of proving the case of an absent
party.
E. Conclusion.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Options for courts.
1. Courts should borrow applicable state law
rules.
2. Options when no state rule is available.
(a) A limited pro tanto rule.
(b) A limited proportional reduction rule.
B. A proposal for a settlement bar system.
1. Fair settlements are encouraged.
2. Settlements with impecunious defendants
are encouraged.
3. Fairness to non-settling defendants.
4. The proposed system will encourage judges
to examine settlements carefully.
5. Judicial economy will be served.
6. The proposed system does not lessen deterrence appreciably.
7. The Nucorp example.
8. Criticisms of the proposed rule.
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This article focuses on a relatively new, judge-made rule
which applies to partial settlements of civil suits under the
federal securities laws. This rule is known as the "proportional
reduction" type of "settlement bar" rule, and it cuts off a
non-settling defendant's rights to obtain contribution from a
defendant who has settled. The rule also provides that any
judgment that the plaintiff later-obtains from the non-settling
defendant will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the defendant who settled. The allocation of tens of
millions of dollars of liability will often turn on the judge's
decision to apply this rule, or a different rule, or no rule at all.
Judges and commentators have recently heaped praise on
this proportional reduction rule, claiming that it is a "neat
solution" to problems and inequities created by earlier alternatives.' This article is intended to examine this rule more closely and realistically.
Section I of this article explains the rule and its alternatives. Section II examines its historical underpinnings. Section
III discusses whether judges have the power to create this rule
and concludes that in most cases they do not. Section IV discusses how the rule meets the goals of deterrence, promotion
of settlement, judicial economy and fairness to plaintiffs. This
section concludes that while the rule is quite equitable to defendants who refuse to settle, it (i) reduces deterrence to a
large class of participants in securities transactions; (ii) prevents many types of partial settlements; (iii) results in negligible overall savings in judicial time and energy; and (iv) places
severe burdens on plaintiffs.
Section V presents the overall conclusion of this article,
which is that the this rule and its alternatives present close and
difficult policy questions which should be resolved by Congress
rather than by the courts. Section V therefore recommends
that until Congress acts on this issue, courts should adopt state
settlement bar rules rather than creating such rules of their
own. Finally, the section proposes a new settlement bar rule
which Congress should consider in order to more fairly balance the interests of all parties.

1. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985). The rule was
judicially adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Franklin v. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222 (9th
Cir. 1989). See also In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Sections 11, 12(l) and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
(commonly referred to as the Securities Act),2 Section 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (commonly referred to as
the Exchange Act)' and Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") rule lOb-54 each provide investors with a private right
of action to recover losses suffered in securities transactions.
These provisions have been the basis for complex lawsuits,
often involving hundreds of plaintiffs whose securities have
become valueless when a securities issuer has fallen upon hard
times. Defendants in these suits are often numerous, frequently including not only the officers and directors of the troubled
issuer, but also its bankers, lawyers, accountants and underwriters.
While federal courts generally want to encourage settlement of these complex cases, a "global" settlement with all
defendants is usually impossible. Accordingly, courts often
seek to dispose of these cases by means of successive partial
settlements: the plaintiffs settle with one defendant at a time.
Each settlement finances the litigation against the remaining
defendants, assures some recovery to the injured plaintiffs, and
places pressure on the defendants who have not settled to do
SO.
This partial settlement process, however, often runs into a
practical obstacle, namely, the contribution rights of the
non-settling co-defendants. Federal securities laws contain express and implied rights to contribution among those liable for
any given injury.' Thus, when one defendant settles with the
plaintiffs, she does not escape the lawsuit; rather, she remains
exposed to the contribution claims of her co-defendants. Given
this fact, there is little advantage for a defendant to enter into
a partial settlement with the plaintiffs, since the plaintiffs'

2. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a- 77aa (West 1991).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(West 1991).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1990).
5. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (West
1991); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(West 1991); Securities Act of 1934 § 18(b), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (West

1991).
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claims against the settling defendant will usually be resurrected
immediately after the settlement in the form of cross-claims for
contribution filed by co-defendants.
Paitial settlements, however, are an important means of
simplifying large securities cases, and federal courts have
found a way of making these settlements attractive to the settling defendant. Specifically, when one defendant settles with
the plaintiff, federal courts often enter orders which extinguish
any contribution claims against that settling defendant. With
such an order, a settling defendant completely escapes the
litigation. While there is no statutory basis in the securities
laws for such "settlement bar" orders, courts are entering them
with increasing frequency."
When such settlement bar orders are entered, there must
be some means of preventing a double recovery to the plaintiffs. Otherwise, plaintiffs could pocket the money paid by the
settling defendant and continue to sue the remaining
non-settling defendants for all the damages. In order to prevent this, the orders usually provide for a "judgment reduction," by which any judgment later entered against the
non-settling defendants will be reduced by the amount which
the settling defendant paid to the plaintiff.
In practice, the process works as follows:
Assume that plaintiffs sue a corporate officer and the
company's outside accounting firm for $100 lost due to a securities fraud. The officer is the mastermind of the fraud and
bears 70% of the responsibility for plaintiffs' loss. The accounting firm disseminated fraudulent information and bears 30%
of the blame for the loss.
Assume that the officer settles with plaintiffs by paying
them $10, and a settlement bar order is then entered, barring
any contribution claims against the settling officer. Plaintiffs
take the accounting firm to trial and win a verdict of $100.
This verdict is reduced by the $10 already paid by the officer,
and a $90 judgment is entered against the accounting firm.

6. See, e.g., Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989);
Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987); Terra-Drill v. Finesod, 726 F.
Supp. 655 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540
(D.Colo. 1989); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.,
698 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Kirkorian v. Borelli, 695 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Cal. 1988); In re Nucorp Sec. Utig.,
661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
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The partial settlement and settlement bar order thus have
the following effect: while the accounting firm bears only 30%
of the blame for plaintiffs' loss, it is left to pay 90% of
plaintiffs' damages. Meanwhile the officer, who is 70% responsible for the fraud, pays only 10% of the damages. Plaintiffs
recover all of their losses.
In such cases, the effects of the settlement bar order may
seem quite unfair to the non-settling defendant. The more culpable defendant, who happened to settle first, pays only a
fraction of his fair share of the damages. The less culpable,
non-settling co-defendant is stripped of his rights to contribution and is left to pay plaintiff the bulk of the damages, most
of which were caused by the more culpable, settling defendant.
In reaction to this perceived unfairness, courts and commentators have touted a "neat solution"7 which has been accepted by the Ninth Circuit.8 Under this solution, a settlement
bar order will be entered when a plaintiff settles with one defendant, but any judgment the plaintiff obtains against the
other defendants will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the settling defendant, rather than by the dollar
settlement amount paid by that defendant.
Returning to the above example, this solution, known as
the "proportional reduction rule," would work as follows (the
assumptions are the same as in the last example): Plaintiffs
have sued the officer and the accounting firm for $100; the officer pays $10 to settle; plaintiffs then win a verdict for $100
from the accounting firm; and the jury allocates 70% of the
fault to the officer and 30% to the accounting firm.
Under the proportional reduction rule, the verdict against
the accounting firm is reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the settling officer (70%), rather than by the $10
that the officer paid in settlement. The $100 verdict against
the accounting firm is therefore reduced by 70%, and the accounting firm pays the plaintiff $30 ($100 - 70% = $30). Under
this rule, the accounting firm pays only its fair share of the

7. See Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also M. Patricia
Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under Rule iOb-5, 66 10WA L REV. 533 (1981); William Bruce Davis, Note, Multiple Defendant Settlement in
lob15: Good Faith Contribution Bar, 40 HASTINGS 1-1. 1253 (1989).
8. Franklin v. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

656

[Vol. 32

damages. Plaintiffs, however, recover only $40 of their $100
loss, $10 from the officer and $30 from the accounting firm.
This solution has been praised because it permits partial
settlements, while placing the risks that these settlements
might be too cheap on the person who negotiates the settlement-the plaintiff. This eliminates the unfairness to the
non-settling defendants.'
The purpose of this article is to re-examine this "neat
solution" and to discuss the weaknesses which have not been
dealt with in detail by the courts and legal scholars who have
considered this issue. Section II discusses the historical background which led to this solution. Section III examines whether judges have the power to adopt this solution or, for that
matter, any "settlement bar" rule which summarily extinguishes
contribution rights prior to trial. Section IV discusses the merits of the solution, specifically its effect on deterrence, settlement, judicial economy arid plaintiffs' rights. Section V proposes that Congress enact a new settlement bar rule which more
effectively balances the interests of all parties.
II.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the 1929 Stock Market crash, Congress
passed the 1933 Securities Act ° and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." The Securities Act was designed to provide investors with full disclosure, to protect them against fraud, and
to promote ethical standards of fair dealing in securities transactions.'" To that end, the Securities Act prohibits offers and
sales of securities unless the securities are exempt or registered
with the SEC. Additionally, it requires that issuers disclose
accurate information about themselves and the securities they
are offering. The Securities Act provides three private rights of
action which are described in the next section.
The purpose of the 1934 Exchange Act was to regulate
exchanges and markets and to protect investors from
manipulation." To accomplish this goal, the Exchange Act

9.
10.
11.
12.
1981).
15.

See supra note 1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1991).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (West 1991).
Tucker v. Arthur Anderson and Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 n.7 (2d Cir.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (West 1991).
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established the SEC, 4 imposed disclosure requirements, prohibited "manipulative devices or contrivances,"' and required
registration of dealers, brokers, exchanges, transfer agents, and
information processors. 6 The 1934 Act contained one express
private right of action for investors and a second has been
judicially recognized. 7
A.

The PrivateRights of Action

The private rights of action under the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act provide injured investors with the right to
sue various parties under certain circumstances. Section 11 of
the Securities Act provides a private right of action to purchasers of registered securities who have suffered losses as a result
of misrepresentations and omissions in a registration statement.' A section 11 action may be brought only against certain defendants, i.e., persons who signed the registration statement, directors, underwriters and accountants, and engineers
and appraisers who prepared or certified part of, and are
named in, the registration statement. The plaintiff in a section
11 action does not need to prove that these defendants acted
with scienter."
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act allows injured purchasers a private right of action against those who misstate a material fact in an offer to sell a security. The purchaser may sue
only persons from whom he bought the security or who played
a substantial role in the transaction."
Section 12(1) of the Securities Act gives purchasers the
right to obtain a refund of the purchase price from anyone
are not registered in accordance with
who sells securities which
2
'
Act.
the
of
5
section

14. The Federal Trade Commission had jurisdiction to enforce the 1933 Securities Act. The 1934 Exchange Act transferred that jurisdiction to the SEC.
HAzEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2, at 6-7.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (West 1991).
78
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 780, 78f, q-1, 78s (West 1991).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (West 1991); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (West 1991).
19. Id.
20. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (West 1991).
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Section 18 of the Exchange Act gives a purchaser or seller
the right to sue any person who makes a false or misleading
statement in documents filed with the SEC." Plaintiff, however, must prove that he read and relied on the misleading
statement."
These express causes of action have been overshadowed
by a judicially implied right of action which has arisen under
SEC Rule 101-5.4 That rule was promulgated by the SEC in
1942, pursuant to its authority under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Rule 10b-5 contains a "catch all" provision that
prohibits fraud and deception in the broadest terms. 5
In 1946, a federal district court first recognized a private
right of action under Rule 10b-5.2 ' As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this private cause of action is available to purchasers and sellers of securities," who may sue any person
who causes them damage by fraud, deceit or use of any manipulative device. The plaintiff in a 101>5 action, however, must
prove that the defendant acted with scienter. s Together, the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act contain five private rights
of action, four of which are expressly stated and one of which
is implied. The next section focuses on the contribution rights
set forth in those Acts.

22. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (West 1991).
23. See, e.g., Ross v. A. H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 552 (2d Cir. 1979).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
25. The Rule provides:
Empluyment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
26. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
27. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730- 31 (1975).
28. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
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The Right to Contribution

Contribution is a means of apportioning liability among
joint tortfeasors. A joint tortfeasor who pays more than his
share of the plaintiff's damages may recover the excess from
the other joint tortfeasors in a contribution action."
Unlike other large federal regulatory schemes," the 1933
and 1934 Acts specifically provide for a right of contribution
among defendants."' Of course, since the right of action under rule 10b-5 is judicially implied, there is no express right to
contribution under this rule. However, the courts which have
considered the question have generally concluded that Congress intended contribution rights to exist among defendants
in securities actions and, therefore, have recognized that an
implied right to contribution exists under Rule 10b-5."

29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1990); see also W. PAGE KEETON,
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 at 339 (5th ed. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 1991); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (West 1991); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1991); ef. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75, 9613(e)(2)
(West 1988).
31. Subsection 11(f) of the 1933 Act provides:
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of
this section shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who
becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover
contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued
separately, would have been liable to make the same payment, unless
the person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty
of fraudulent misrepresentation.
15 U.S.C. 77k(f) (West 1991)). Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides: "Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original suit,
would have been liable to make to same payment." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i(e) (West
1991). Section 18(b) of the Exchange Act contains a nearly identical provision. 15
U.S.C. § 78r(b) (West 1991).
32. Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 558 (5th Cir. 1981), affld in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1971); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318 F.
Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid per cuiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971). But
see In rt Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn.
1988).
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Two Trends in Modem Law

By including private rights of action under the securities
laws, Congress set the stage at the federal level for the conflict
between two important trends in the law. The first trend is
toward a fair - critics say an impossibly mathematically exact allocation of damages among joint tortfeasors. The second
trend is toward encouraging partial settlements in complex,
multi-defendant cases. The next two sections will examine
these trends.
1. The Trend Toward a Fair Allocation of Damages Among
Joint Tortfeasors
For the past two centuries American courts and state legislatures have expanded and refined the contribution rights of
defendants. The English case of Merryweather v. Nixan ss stated
the common law rule that there could be no contribution
among intentional tortfeasors. Unfortunately, Merryweather suffered a sea change as it was imported into this country, and it
came to be cited for the proposition that there was no right to
contribution among any joint tortfeasors, irrespective of whether their torts were negligent or intentional.' This revised,
harsher Meryweather rule was adopted into the common law of
virtually every state, and contribution among tortfeasors became generally unavailable in this country." The trend toward
fair allocation of liability among joint tortfeasors began as
courts and legislatures recognized the rule against contribution
as unduly harsh. The large majority of states have eased this
rule, either by statute or judicial decision, to allow some sort
of contribution among joint tortfeasors.'

33. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
34. See Theodore W. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Mernyweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176, 177 (1898); Keeton et al.,
supma note 29, at 337. Apparently in this country the Merryweather rule was first
applied only to cases involving intentional torts; however, when courts began al-

lowing joinder of persons who were negligently responsible for the same torts, the
Meryueather rule began to be applied to negligence cases as well. KEETON ET AL.,
§ 50, at 337.
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 50 at 337.
36. KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 50 at 338.
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Some states began allocating fault among joint tortfeasors
in a rough and simple way; specifically, contribution was allowed on a "pro rata" basis. Thus, for contribution purposes,
damages were divided equally among the joint tortfeasors regardless of their relative fault, and a defendant was entitled to
contribution only to the extent that he paid more than his
fractional share of the plaintiffs damages. 7
For example, assume that A and B caused $100 in damages to P. After trial, A pays P the entire $100 judgment. Under
the pro rata system, A's share of the damages would be the
total damages ($100) divided by the number of tortfeasors (2),
or $50. Since A has paid $100 to P, A would have the right to
recover the $50 he paid in excess of his share from B. A could
file a contribution claim against B for this amount.
The trend toward precise allocation of damages took its
next step as courts realized the unfairness inherent in the pro
rata system: It divides fault equally among defendants who
might not be equally responsible for the plaintiffs' damages.
Thus in the last example, even if A were only 10% responsible
for P's damages, the pro rata system would require A to pay
50% of the damages.
Courts and legislators, troubled with this result, began
allowing contribution on a "comparative fault" basis." Under
such a system, a defendant can recover from his co- defendants
any amount he pays in excess of his fair share of the damages.
Returning to the previous example, assume that A is 10% responsible and B is 90% responsible for the $100 in damages to
P. A's fair share of the damages is $10 and B's is $90. If A pays
P the entire $100, A has paid $90 more than his fair share and
may file a contribution claim against B for this $90.
This trend toward a more precise allocation of damages is
specifically seen in cases decided under the securities laws. The
early cases allowed contribution on a pro rata basis." Recent

37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 50, Item 8 at 340.
38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 50 at 336-41; see, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978); cf. Berry v. Empire Indemnity Ins. Co., 634 P. 2d 718 (Okla. 1981).
39. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370-71 (D. Md. 1975), afd, 542
F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
540 F.2d 27, 39 (2nd Cir. 1976); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a~fd per cwian 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971).
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securities law cases have, held that contribution should be
based on the relative culpability of defendants."
2.
Cases

The Trend Toward PartialSettlement of Complex Securities

The trend toward fairer allocation of damages among
joint tortfeasors conflicts with another trend, which arises from
the desire of district court judges to foster partial settlements
of complex, multi-defendant cases, similar to those often filed
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The Acts
4
themselves are silent as to the importance of settlement, but
practical considerations give judges great incentives to push
for, and approve, partial settlements.
The main practical consideration is the size and complexity of many securities cases. The demise of a major company
can give rise to claims for millions of dollars under the Acts.
The number of possible defendants is also quite large, and
42
includes more than the corporate "insiders" who may have
played a central role in the fraud. Modern plaintiffs' lawyers
feel obliged to also sue the troubled corporation's securities
underwriters, investment bankers, bankers, accountants, attorneys and major investors. Trials of such cases, which may involve different theories of liability and standards of proof as to
the various defendants, may take months.
Judges and magistrates, therefore, expend enormous enerattempts to settle these cases.4 If a "global" settlement
in
gy
as to all defendants is not possible, courts strongly encourage
partial settlements, in which the plaintiff settles with one, or a
few, of the many defendants. Courts see several advantages to

40. Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1987); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272-77 (D.Del 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979). For a criticism of the holdings in these cases, see Adam S.
Affleck, Note, Apportioning Contribution in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
MultiDefendant Suits: A Critique of Relative Culpability Shares in the Wake of Smith v.
Mulvaney, 1988 B.Y.U. L REv. 409 (1988).
41. See Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672,
675 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
42. The term "insider" is used in this article to refer to directors and officers
of an issuer and does not connote any prohibited insider trading.
43. See, e.g., Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1987); In
re Nucorp. Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (S.D. Cal. 1987) ("over one
hundred settlement or settlement-related conferences or hearings" were held).
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these partial settlements. First, they simplify the remaining
litigation by removing one defendant and much of the controversy as to what that defendant did or did not do. Second,
they ensure that at least some money is paid to the plaintiffs.
These plaintiffs usually have suffered genuine economic loss
due to the failure of their investment, and courts are happy to
see them compensated. Finally, these settlements put pressure
on the other defendants to settle because the remaining defendants realize that plaintiff's case will be adequately financed by
the first settlement and do not want to be the last defendant
left to go to trial."
D.

The Conflict Between the Trends

The goals of contribution and partial settlement are in
conflict. The very existence of a right to contribution makes
partial settlement virtually impossible. Where such a right exists, if one joint tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff that
tortfeasor remains liable in contribution to all of the other
joint tortfeasors, many of whom will already have filed
cross-claims against him. Accordingly, there is very little incentive for one defendant to enter into a settlement with the
plaintiff. Judge Irving has noted that in the absence of any
means for cutting off contribution rights against a settling
defendant, partial settlement of any federal securities question
before trial is, as a practical matter, impossible:
Any single defendant who refuses to settle, for whatever
reason, forces all other defendants to trial. Anyone foolish
enough to settle without barring contribution is courting
disaster. They are allowing the total damages, from which
their ultimate share will be derived, to be determined in a
trial where they are not even represented."5
E. A Solution: Settlement Bar Statutes
Many states have solved this problem by enacting "settlement bar" statutes. A settlement bar statute extinguishes con-

44. See M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 66 IOwA L. REV. 533, 543 (1981).
45. Nuco p, 661 F. Supp. at 1408.
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tribution rights against a settling defendant. If such a statute is
applicable, the settling defendant can escape the lawsuit without any further liability to the plaintiff or to joint tortfeasors.
Settlement bar statutes have been enacted in twenty-six
states' and fall into three general categories. The major difference among the three categories is the means of calculating
the "judgment reduction," i.e., the amount of credit the
non-settling defendants receive in light of the settlement. This
credit or 'judgment reduction" is necessary to prevent a double recovery. Without it, a plaintiff could recover all of its damages from one defendant and proceed to sue and recover a
large settlement from the remaining defendants.
The first type of settlement bar statute is based on the
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act of 1939."'
This Act provides that contribution rights against a settling
defendant are extinguished if the settlement is reached before
the "right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment
has accrued."" The non-settling defendants receive a pro rata

46. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16- 61-205 (1987);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tite 10 6304 (1975): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(1986); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 663-15 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-806
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 70, para. 302 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE, ART. 50, § 20
(1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch 231 B, 4 (1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-5 (1986); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983); N.D.
CENT.CODE § 32-38-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2307.32 (1981); OKLA.
STAT ANN. title 12, 832 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.455 (1988); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8327 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS 10-6-8 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 15-8-18 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-35.1 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (1981).
47. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 5, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1939).
The Act remains in force in nine states. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. title 10 6304 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT § 663-15 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 6-806 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 20 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-3-5 (Michie 1986); 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
10-6-8 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8- 18 (1984).
The Arkansas statute reads:
A release by the injured of one (1) joint tortfeasor does not
relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint
tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other
tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued,
and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of
the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all the other tortfeasors.
48. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 5, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1939).
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judgment reduction. Any judgment entered against these
non-settling parties will be reduced by the pro rata share of
damages attributable to the settling defendant. 9
The following example illustrates the application of this
rule. Assume the Settling Defendant (SD) and the Non- Settling Defendant (NSD) cause $100 in damages to P. SD immediately settles by paying $20 to P. P then takes NSD to trial
and obtains a verdict against NSD for the $100 in damages.
NSD, however, is entitled to a judgment reduction as a result
of the settlement between SD and P. With a pro rata judgment
reduction rule, the amount of the judgment reduction is SD's
pro rata share. Since there are two defendants, SD's pro rata
share is one half, or $50. NSD is therefore liable to P for only
$50 (the $100 judgment less SD's $50 pro rata share). Under
this rule, because P accepted less in settlement from SD than
SD's pro rata share, P recovers a total of only $70 ($20 from
SD and $50 from NSD), rather than the $100 in damages that
she suffered.
The second type of settlement bar statute, based on the
1955 revised version of the Uniform Act, provides that a settlement made in "good faith" between plaintiff and one defendant extinguishes any rights of contribution which the
non-settling defendants may have against the defendant who
settled.' "Good faith" is usually defined to mean the absence
49. In continuance of the trend toward a more precise allocation of fault
among joint tortfeasors, the term pr rata has recently been interpreted in at least
one state to mean a comparative fault share. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 522
A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1987).
50. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act) § 4, 12
U.LA. 108 (West 1975). This version is in force in the following states: ALASKA
STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.31 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 70, para. 302 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch 231 B, 4 (1986); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1988); NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.245
(1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN § 2307.32 (1981); OKLA. STAT ANN. title 12, 832 (1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.455 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-35.1 (1984).
The Ohio statute reads in part:
(F) When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable
in tort for the same injury or loss to person or property or the same
wrongful death, the following apply:
1) The release or covenant does not discharge any of the other
tortfeasors from ...
claim[s] against the other tortfeasors to the
extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in

fV V
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of fraud or collusion between the settling defendant and the
plaintiff. 1 The 1955 Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act provides a pro tanto judgment reduction provision rather than the pro rata provision applicable under the
1939 Uniform Act. 2 Under the pro tanto rule, the ultimate
judgment against the non-settling defendant is reduced by the
amount actually paid in settlement by the settling defendant.
The following example illustrates the pro tanto rule: as in
the last hypothetical, assume SD and NSD caused $100 in damages to P, and SD settles by paying $20. P then obtains a verdict against NSD for the $100. NSD is entitled to a judgment
reduction of the amount paid by SD ($20). NSD's liability to P
is therefore $80 ($100 minus $20), and P recovers all of her
damages ($20 in settlement from SD and $80 from NSD).
In some states, before the contribution rights of the
non-settling defendants are extinguished, a court must make
the determination that the partial settlement has been made in
"good faith." In California, a summary pre-trial hearing is held
to determine whether the settlement was reached in good
faith." Under the seminal case of Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde
and Associates,' the amount of the settlement is relevant to
the issue of good faith. In order to meet the "good faith" standard, the amount which the settling defendant pays to settle

the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater;
2) The release or covenant discharges the tortfeasor to whom
it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
51. Cardio Sys. v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (App. Ct. 1981).
52. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act) § 4, 12
U.L.A. 108 (West 1975).
53. Section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or
more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt,
shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or
more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors ....
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice
of hearing, and any counter-affidavits filed in response thereto, or the
court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made
in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from
any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor from
equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
54. 698 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1985).
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the case must be in the "ballpark," that is, it must not be grossly disproportionate to the settling defendant's fair share of
damages.55 If the settlement amount is so low as to be "out of
the ballpark," the court will not extinguish contribution rights
of the non-settling defendant.
The third type of settlement bar statute is exemplified by
the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which has been
adopted in two states.' Section 6 of this act provides that
"the claim of the releasing person against other persons is
reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable
share of the obligation...." In other words, any judgment
against the non-settling defendant will be reduced by the percentage of fault which is attributable to the defendant who settled. This type of statute is discussed in detail in section II, H
of this article.
F. The Securities Acts Contain No Specific Means for Reconciling
the Competing Trends
Settlement bar rules are creatures of statute. A serious
problem has arisen under the securities law because, while the
Securities Act and Exchange Act contain explicit and implied
rights to contribution, the Acts contain no mention of any
means of extinguishing contribution claims in the context of a
partial settlement. Accordingly, if the securities laws are taken
at face value, partial settlement of multi-defendant cases is
virtually impossible because there is no mechanism for a settling defendant to obtain a settlement bar and escape the case.
G. The Ninth CircuitExperience
This problem has been most fully played out in the Ninth
Circuit, which ultimately became the first circuit to judicially

55. Id. at 167. This inquiry into the price of the settlement is at odds with
the rule in most states which have adopted the 1955 Revised Version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. In these states good faith is defined to
mean only the absence of collusion between plaintiff and defendant.
56. Uniform Comparative Fault Act §§ 2,6 (1977 Act), 12 U.L.A. 49, 56
(West Supp. 1992). This version is in force in the following states: IOWA CODES
ANN. § 668.1 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (1981). New York has
adopted a contribution statute of its own, which contains a judgment reduction
rule similar to that contained in § 6 of the Uniform Act. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 15-108 (1978).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

668

[Vol. 32

adopt the "proportional reduction" type of settlement bar rule.
Until recently, the Ninth Circuit took the absence of a settlement bar rule under the securities laws as it found it, declining
two invitations to create a settlement bar rule by judicial action."
1.

The Laventhol Case

In Laventhol," for example, plaintiffs, who had invested
in ill-fated real estate partnerships, sued the partnership's "insiders," as well as its underwriter and its accounting firm, alleging losses of at least $2,000,000. Prior to trial plaintiffs entered into a settlement with two of the "insider" defendants by
which plaintiffs received $8,000 towards costs and a promise
that these defendants would cooperate in the remaining litigation. These settling defendants then sought a settlement bar
order. Specifically, they asked the court for summary judgment
on the cross- claims for contribution which had been filed
against them by the remaining defendants. They argued that
these claims were barred by the settlement. The district court,
apparently eager to simplify the litigation by approving this
partial settlement, granted the motion and extinguished the
contribution claims of the non-settling defendants.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that there was no basis
in the securities laws for extinguishing settlement rights prior
to trial. "By enacting section 77k(f) of the Securities Act, Congress expressed its preference between the sometimes conflicting values of settlement and contribution. A right of contribution is clearly enunciated, but the statute is silent as to the
encouragement of settlements.""
In dicta, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested a "no harm,
no foul" rule. Specifically, the court stated that "[i]f it could be
said that [settling defendants'] settlement with the plaintiff
class had resulted in their bearing their proper share of damages," it "might" be proper to extinguish any contribution
rights against the settling defendants.' The reasoning was ap57. Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987); Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980), cet. denied, 452
U.S. 963 (1981).
58. Laventhol, 637 F.2d at 672.
59. Id. at 675.
60. Id.
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parently that there is no right of contribution against a defendant who pays his "proper share." Contribution exists only in
favor of defendants who pay too much and against defendants
who pay less than their "proper share."
The settlement in Laventhol was patently unfair. It called
for major defendants to escape a two million dollar action by
payment of $8,000 in costs. Thus, there was little incentive for
the Ninth Circuit to hold that this inadequate payment extinguished contribution rights.
2.

Smith v.

Mulvaney

Seven years later, however, the Ninth Circuit received a
case presenting a much more balanced settlement and a much
more developed record. In Smith v. Mulvaney,"' investors in a
defunct bank sued directors and officers of the bank. A group
of directors and officers settled with plaintiff by paying
$722,000. A non-settling "insider" defendant, Mrs. Smith, went
to trial. The jury awarded $4,402,476 against Mrs. Smith and
2
assessed an additional $750,000 in punitive damages.
Mrs. Smith then brought an action for contribution
against the settling directors. These directors moved for summary judgment on the ground that their prior settlement had
extinguished Mrs. Smith's right to contribution from them.
The trial court granted the settling directors' motion, finding
that, under Laventhol, these defendants had paid their "proper
share" of the damages. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed,
stating, "[t]his court finds that the evidence on which the trial
court based its decision fails to support adequately a conclusive
finding the settling defendants paid their proper share of damages. "63
Taken at face value, the standard enunciated by the Ninth
Circuit in Smith is surprisingly strict. Before contribution
claims against a settling defendant can be extinguished, the
defendant must make a "conclusive" showing that he has paid
his "proper share" of the damages.

61. Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at 559-60.
63. Id. at 561.
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District Court Cases

At the time when the Ninth Circuit was refusing to extinguish contribution rights against settling defendants, the district courts, which were faced with the prospect of trying these
complex cases if settlements could not be reached, were viewing partial settlements with a more accepting eye. In fact, these
trial courts were approving such settlements and extinguishing
contribution rights against the settling defendants.'
Nucorp,' decided in the Southern District of California
just prior to the decision in Smith, exemplifies the problems
faced by the district courts. Nucorp arose from the bankruptcy
of Nucorp Energy, Inc. Investors sued corporate "insiders" as
well as Nucorp's accountant, securities underwriter, banker
and a major investor. Plaintiffs' "baseline" damages were estimated to be $230 million.' The trial threatened to be very
lengthy and the judge and magistrate made concerted efforts
to reach a pretrial settlement, including over one hundred
settlement conferences."7 Finally a partial settlement was
reached by which "insider" defendants offered to pay plaintiffs
$41 million, contingent on the court's entering a settlement
bar order extinguishing any contribution claims against these
settling "insider" defendants." The settlement bar order was
to require a pro tanto reduction of any subsequent judgment.
Therefore, any judgment later entered against the non-settling
defendants would be reduced by the $41 million the settling
defendants had paid in settlement.
The non-settling defendants challenged the proposed settlement bar order, arguing that the securities laws contain no
provision for extinguishing contribution rights prior to trial
and that the proposed settlement was unfair because it allowed
the primarily-liable "insider" defendants to escape liability by
payment of $41 million. The non- settling defendants argued

64. See, e.g., Alvarado
re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698
F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal.
1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
65. In re Nucorp Sec.
66. Id. at 1410.
67. Id. at 1405.
68. Id.

Partners v. Mebta, 723 F. Supp. 540 (D.Colo 1989); In
F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Nelson v. Bennett, 662
1987); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp.
Utig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
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that the proposed order would leave the secondarily liable
defendants exposed to pay the balance of damages, which
could exceed $180 million."
The court approved the settlement and entered the settlement bar order as requested by the settling "insiders." The
court did not dispute the settling defendants' liability. On the
contrary, it noted that a major portion of the settlement payment was made under the settling defendants' insurance policies and that there was evidence that the settling "insiders" had
committed "acts of dishonesty" which, if exposed at trial,
would not be subject to coverage under the policies." The
court felt the settlement was wise because it captured these
policies for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
The court also reasoned that the settlement should be
accepted because an independent magistrate had participated
in settlement discussions, because the settlement was adequate
in light of the uncertainty of collecting a larger judgment, and
because of the uncertainties of litigation.' Finally, while the
court cited the "proper share" standard enunciated in
Laventhol, it could not quite hold that these "insider" defendants (who may have committed "acts of dishonesty" sufficient
to vitiate their insurance coverage) were paying their "proper
share" by contributing 18% of plaintiffs' damages. The court,
therefore, altered the "proper share" standard and found
merely that the settling defendants' payment was "sufficiently
related" to their fair share of the liability.
The court obviously felt great pressure to approve the
settlement. First, doing so would simplify what was bound to
be a lengthy trial and it would put great pressure on the other
defendants to settle. Second, the settlement locked in a substantial cash recovery for plaintiffs who had suffered palpable
economic losses.
On the other hand, aspects of the settlement were seemingly unfair. It allowed apparently highly culpable defendants
to escape the action by paying only a small percentage of the
damages they had caused, leaving secondarily liable parties
exposed to pay the balance. In addition, there is no clear
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

d. at 1406.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
Id.at 1409-10.
In the Nucotp

case,

the

plaintiffs

later went

to

trial

against

the
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basis in the securities laws for the settlement bar order entered
in this and similar cases, and Nucorp contains no discussion of
the basis for the court's power to enter such an order. The
Nucorp case thus illustrates the dilemmas presented by a settling defendant's request that contribution rights be extinguished. Other aspects of the Nucorp case will be discussed in
later sections.
H. The Kaypro Solution
The settlement bar question again reached the Ninth Cir74
cuit in the case of Franklin v. Kaypro Corp. There, investors
in the troubled Kaypro Corporation brought a class action
against various "insiders" and against Kaypro's accounting firm
and securities underwriter. The plaintiffs alleged that violations
of the securities laws had caused them to suffer between $19
million and $22 million in damages. Plaintiffs agreed to settle
with the "insider" defendants for $9.25 million with the condition that a settlement bar order be entered with a provision
for a pro tanto judgment reduction. Over the objections of the
non- settling defendants, the district court entered the order,
which was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
By the time this case reached the Ninth Circuit, several
district court judges had dealt with the settlement bar issue in
thoughtful opinions.7 s The court was therefore fully aware of
the practical importance of the settlement bar rule in promoting partial settlements," but it was also aware of the great unfairness which partial settlements can work on non-settling
defendants.7
The court, therefore, adopted what had previously been
termed a "neat solution.""' It used its "common law" powers
to create a settlement bar rule which would extinguish the
contribution rights of non-settling defendants against those

non-settling defendants. One defendant defaulted during trial and later settled
with plaintiff. The jury returned a defense verdict against the other defendants.
The Efficient- Market's Juty, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1988, at A24.
74. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. See supra note 7.
76. See Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 551 (D. Colo. 1989).
77. 1d. at 552-53; Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
78. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985); In rv Sunrise
Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp 1256, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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who settle." The court then rejected the pro tanto judgment
reduction rule, by which plaintiff's recovery against the
non-settling defendants is reduced by the actual amount the
settling defendant has already paid in settlement. Instead, the
court adopted a "proportional reduction rule," by which any
judgment against the non-settling defendant will be reduced by
the proportion of fault attributable to the settling defendant.

In line with the trend toward precise allocation of damages
among co-defendants, this proportion is not to be calculated
on a pro rata basis. Rather, when the plaintiff takes the case to
trial against the non-settling defendant, the jury will be asked
to decide not only the liability of that defendant, but also what
percentage of fault is attributable to the defendant who has
settled. The plaintiffs ultimate judgment against the
non-settling defendants will be reduced by that percentage.'
The following example illustrates the "proportional reduction" rule. Assume that SD and NSD cause $100 in damage to
P. P settles with SD first, for $20. P then goes to trial against
NSD. The jury finds P's damages to be $100 and finds that
90% of these damages are attributable to SD and 10% to NSD.
Under the proportional reduction rule, the amount to be paid
by NSD is the amount of P's damages ($100) less the proportion attributable to SD (90%). NSD is therefore liable to P for
only $10 ($100 minus 90% = $10). Moreover, because P made
a cheap settlement with SD, P recovers a total of only $30 ($20
from SD and $10 From NSD), rather than the $100 in damages that she suffered. 81

79. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Id.at 1231-32. While Kaypro did not cite the 1977 Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, it did adopt a judgment reduction rule which is substantially similar to
the rule set forth in § 6 of that Act.
81. Of course the system can also work in the plaintiff's favor. Again, assume
SD and NSD cause $100 in damages to P. P accepts $ 20 in settlement from SD.
P then goes to trial against NSD. The jury finds P's damages to be $100 and
finds that 90% are attributable to NSD and 10% to SD. NSD must therefore pay
P $90, which consists of P's damages ($100) less the proportion attributable to SD
(10%, i.e., $10). P thus collects $90 from NSD and $ 20 from SD, for a total of
$110, more than her total damages.
One state statute prevents this excess recovery to plaintiff by providing that
the judgment reduction will be the percentage of fault attributable to the
non-settling defendant or the amount paid in settlement by that defendant, whichever isgreater. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108.
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The Kaypro court concluded that the proportional reduction rule is an optimal solution because it meets the statutory
goals of punishing each wrongdoer, limiting each defendant's
liability to his or her relative culpability, and encouraging settlement.'
This article will now subject this "neat solution" to critical
analysis. First, the threshold question passed over by cases and
commentators will be faced: whether courts have the power to
create a rule that will summarily extinguish legal rights which
have been created by statute or implied from the intent of
Congress. Then other aspects of the proportional reduction
rule will be turned to, returning from time to time to the facts
of the Nucorp decision to see how this rule would have
changed the outcome in that difficult case. Finally, this article
will propose that Congress consider a new settlement bar rule
which better balances the interests of all parties.
III.

THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: Do COURTS HAVE THE

COMMON LAW POWER TO CREATE A SETTLEMENT BAR RULE?

Federal courts have spent a great deal of energy debating
the merits of the pro tanto and proportional reduction rules.
The cases, however, give little attention to the threshold question of whether courts have the power to extinguish, before
trial, the contribution rights of non- settling defendants. Thus,
several cases conclude, without discussion, that federal courts
do have the common law power to extinguish contribution
rights and apply a judgment reduction rule.S Kaypro comes to
this conclusion in a footnote with a cite to Texas Industries, Inc.
v. Radciff Materials, Inc.' Similarly, an insightful article promoting the proportional reduction rule assumes, with a brief
citation to Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States and United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., that courts have the common law power
to extinguish contribution rights before trial.'

82. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1231.
83. See, e.g., Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540 (C.D. Colo. 1989);
In ir Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal 1987).
84. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1228 n.10 ("However, because Congress has not yet
created laws governing the right it created, the federal courts are free to fashion
a common law.") (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981)).
85. William Bruce Davis, Note, Multiple Defendant Settlement in lOb-5: Good
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The following discussion questions whether courts have
this power. First, this section lists the traditional bases for creation of federal common law rules. After this, the article examines the Texas Industries case and concludes that it does not
support the proposition that judges can create rules that summarily extinguish causes of action for contribution.' Specifically, the traditional prerequisites for exercise of federal common law powers are absent because no uniquely federal interests are involved and the proposed rules are not supported by
the intent of Congress.
Next, this section examines whether creation of a settlement bar rule is a legitimate exercise of the federal courts'
power to fill in the gaps or interstices in federal statutes. After
discussing a line of cases that distinguishes between statutorily
and judicially created rights, the section concludes that courts
lack power to extinguish the statutorily created contribution
rights, but they may have power to apply settlement bar rules
to judicially created contribution rights.
After this, the section discusses the two types of judgment
reduction rules. Specifically, I deal with the argument that
courts have the power to apply the proportional reduction rule
because it involves a lesser exercise of judicial power than does
application of the pro tanto rule.
Finally, the section turns to the argument, passed over by
most observers, that if judges do have the power to adopt settlement bar rules, they must borrow these rules from state law.
The section concludes that courts should borrow settlement
bar rules from state law, if any state rules are applicable.

Faith Contribution Bar, 40 HASTINGS UJ. 1253, 1264 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715 (1979)).
86. A detailed discussion of the Texas Indus. case is set forth below. Neither
Cleatfield nor Kimbeil is a particularly appropriate basis for creation of federal
common law rules regarding contribution between private parties. Clealfield involved an action on a federal contract, and actions involving such federal rights
have long been held to invoke "uniquely federal interests" sufficient to invoke
federal common law powers. Similarly, Kimbeil involved contractual liens arising
from federal loan programs. No such federal rights are involved in a private action for contribution under the securities laws and the basis for federal common
law jurisdiction in Cleatfield and Kimbell is therefore of little relevance here.
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The TraditionalBasesfor Creation of Federal Common Law

Traditionally, federal courts have created common law
rules in the following five types of situations:
1. Admiralty cases;"7
2. Cases between states or nations;
3. Cases involving uniquely federal interests, such as the
property or contractual rights of the United States;"
4. Cases where Congress has given courts the power to
create common law rules;' and
5. Cases where federal common law is needed to fill in the
gaps or interstices in federal statutory provisions."'
The first two of these traditional bases for creation of
federal common law are not relevant here. Creation of a settlement bar rule in the securities law context does not involve
any admiralty issues or any disputes between states or nations.
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether either the
third, fourth or fifth factor is present. More specifically, it
must be determined whether judicial creation of settlement
bar rules is warranted (1) by any uniquely federal interest, (2)
by the intent of Congress, or (3) by the need to fill in the interstices in federal securities laws. This inquiry begins with an
examination of the Texas Industries case.
B.

The Texas Industries Case

Texas Industries is one of two 1980 cases in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a right to contribution could be judicially implied under federal statutes. In Texas
Industries and a companion case, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers," the Supreme Court concluded that federal
courts lacked the common law power to imply a right of action
for contribution." Because Texas Industries gives insight into
87. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jansen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917).
88. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 96-99 (1907); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-26 (1964).
89. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
90. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
91. Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77
(1981).
92. Id.
93. In Northwest, flight attendants sued the airline under the Equal Pay Act of
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the Supreme Court's thinking on the extent to which judges
may create common law rules, it will be examined more closely
here.
The defendant, Texas Industries, was accused of fixing the
prices of ready-mix concrete in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Plaintiff sought treble damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. During discovery, Texas
Industries learned that certain parties were alleged to be its
co-conspirators in the purported price fixing scheme. The
company thereupon filed claims for contribution against these
alleged co-conspirators. The district court dismissed Texas
Industries' contribution claims" and the Fifth Circuit affirmed." Both courts engaged in a weighing of the policy considerations for and against the creation of a right to contribution, and then concluded that such a right did not exist."
When it granted certiorari, the Supreme Court thus faced
a situation similar to the one described in this article, where
the advantages of a proposed rule had been discussed to the
exclusion of an examination of federal courts' power to create
the rule. In fact, in writing for the unanimous court, Chief
Justice Burger noted that in the "vigorous debate over the
advantages and disadvantages of contribution and various contribution schemes, the parties, amici, and commentators have
paid less attention to a very significant and perhaps dispositive
threshold question: whether courts have the power to create
such a cause of action absent legislation. " "
Accordingly, the Court did not spend much time discussing the relative merits of the proposed contribution remedy.
Rather, Chief Justice Burger's opinion was a discourse on the
means by which such a right could be recognized.
The Court noted that a right of contribution may be created in two ways, "first, through the affirmative creation of a
right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear impli-

1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging discriminatory practices. Northwest filed a claim for contribution against the employees' union, claiming that the union had promoted the discriminatory practices. Neither act contained an explicit right to contribution, and the Supreme Court held that the
courts lacked the power to create such a right.
94. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 633 (1981).
95. Abraham Const. Co. v. Texas Indus., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
96. Id.
97. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638.
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cation; or second, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal common law of contribution."" The Court rejected both theories. In reviewing the antitrust statute, the
Court found nothing in the text or legislative history which
would warrant implication of a right to contribution."
The Court then turned to federal common law. It noted
that there is no general federal common law, and no specific
federal common law of contribution, but that common law
could be created in limited areas which are "few and
restricted."'" The Court described how these limited areas
fall essentially into two categories, those in which a federal rule
of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests"
and those in which "Congress has given the courts the power
to develop substantive law ....
The Court noted that cases involving "uniquely federal
interests" were usually those involving the rights and obligations of the United States, disputes between the states, and
admiralty matters.'" In such cases, where the sovereign rights
of the Unites States are involved or where the common law of
the states would conflict, federal common law should logically
apply. 0
Significantly, the Court held that contribution among
antitrust defendants did not involve any "uniquely federal interests":
[C]ontribution among antitrust wrongdoers does not involve the duties of the Federal Government, the distribution of powers in our federal system, or matters necessarily subject to federal control even in the absence of statutory authority. In short, contribution does not implicate
"uniquely federal interests" of the kind that oblige courts
to formulate federal common law."'

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 640-41 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
Id. at 640.
Id. See also Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union of Am., 451

U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
103. Federal common law has also been applied in the area of admiralty, because admiralty is a unique area of federal concern. Federal common law rules of
contribution in the admiralty sphere are accordingly not predicates for common
law rules in other areas of federal law.
104. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642 (citations omitted).
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The Court then looked at the statutory history of the antitrust laws in order to see whether Congress had given judges
the power, under those statutes, to develop common law remedies such as contribution. It found the introductory language
of the Sherman Act to be sufficiently broad to provide courts
with a good deal of power to "give shape to the statute's broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.""° Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found nothing in the statutory history
which would give courts the power to create a new remedy,
such as contribution. 6
The Court concluded that the policy decision as to whether a right of contribution should exist was so'close and complex that it should be decided by Congress."
Commentators have criticized the Texas Industries decision
because it takes too conservative a view of federal judicial pow0 Nevertheless, the opinion remains the expression of the
er."
law by a unanimous Supreme Court and, as it is an exercise in
judicial restraint, it is doubtful that its reasoning would be
altered much by the present Court. Accordingly, even though
the cases and commentators have brushed by the issue, it is
necessary to examine whether the Kaypro court and other
courts exceeded their common law powers when they created
settlement bar and judgment reduction rules.
C. The Texas Industries Analysis of the Bases for Federal Common
Law Powers
Under Texas Industries, common law rules may be created
in cases where they are necessary to protect "uniquely federal
interests" or where Congress has given courts the power to
develop substantive law.' As the next two sections will show,
neither factor warrants judicial creation of settlement bar rules
in the securities context.

105. Id. at 643 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
106. Id. at 642-45.
107. Id. at 647.
108. See E. Allen Hieb, Jr., Note, Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc.:
No Help From Their Friends, 33 MERCER L. REV. 657 (1982); Jill Nutter Fusch,
Note, There Is No Basis In Federal Statutory or Common Law for Allowing Federal
Courts to Fashion a Right of Contribution Among Antitrust Wrongdoers-Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 50 U. CIN. L REv. 821 (1981).
109. Texas Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. 630.
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1. A Settlement Bar Rule Does Not Involve Any Uniquely
FederalInterests
Applying the first factor, extinguishing contribution rights
does not involve any "uniquely federal interest" which would
permit judges to create new common law rules. No rights of
the United States, conflicts between states, or admiralty matters are involved. Moreover, Texas Industries held that the antitrust laws did not affect "federal interests" in a way sufficient
to permit federal courts to create new common law rules of
contribution. If allowing antitrust defendants to seek contribution from one another does not implicate a "uniquely federal
interest," it is difficult to see how extinguishing contribution
rights under the securities laws would implicate such an interest. Both issues mainly involve the rights of private business
litigants against each other. No interest of the Federal Government is involved. The federal interest which is present under
both laws is quite similar, the regulation of the economy. If
this consideration was insufficient to warrant federal common
law jurisdiction in the antitrust context, it is similarly insufficient in the securities law context. Therefore, the first basis for
implying federal common law suggested in Texas Industries will
not support the creation of settlement bar and judgment reduction rules.
2. There Is No Evidence of CongressionalIntent Sufficient to
Empower Courts to Create a Settlement Bar Rule
The second basis for creation of federal common law is
the intent of Congress to give courts the power to develop
substantive law. The securities laws, like the antitrust laws,
contain introductory language which has been interpreted to
give courts the power to construe them broadly to effect their
remedial purpose."' Under Texas Industries, such broad language was held insufficient to give judges power to create new
antitrust remedies."' Similarly, the broad provisions of the
securities laws contain no language indicating that Congress

110. See Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 1981).
111. Texas Indus, 451 U.S. 630.

1992]

PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION RULE

intended to give courts added common law powers to create
significant new remedial rules under the Acts.
Unlike the antitrust laws, the federal securities laws contain a specific grant of a right to contribution."' There is
nothing in the contribution sections, however, which indicates
that Congress intended courts to have power to alter or extinguish this expressly created right. Moreover, the main goal of
the proposed settlement bar rule is the promotion of settlement. The securities laws are silent as to settlement, and Congress gave no clear signs that it wished to empower federal
judges to tamper with the remedies created under the securities laws to promote settlement.
As in Texas Industries, it appears that there is no specific
basis in the securities laws or their history for giving courts the
power to create new settlement bar and judgment reduction
rules.
D. Authority to Create Settlement Bar Rules May Arise from the
Court's InterstitialPowers
While the authority to create a settlement bar rule does
not arise from any federal interest or from any clearly stated
or implied intent of Congress, the basis for such a rule might
be found in courts' "interstitial powers." Thus, in Northwest
Airlines,"' the Supreme Court confirmed that when Congress
enacts any federal statute, it grants federal courts the common
law power to set the contours of the law and fill in the "interstices" between the specific provisions which it has enacted.""
The following discussion examines the scope of this power.
The search for the boundaries of this "interstitial" power
yields several place markers. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court held in Texas Industries that this power does not include
the authority to create a right to contribution."' However,
the Court has also held that it does include the power to bor-

112.

15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (West 1991); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (West 1991); 15 U.S.C.

§ 78r(b) (West 1991).

113. Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77
(1981).
114. Id. at 97; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975).
115. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630; Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

row state, and sometimes federal, statutes of limitations and
apply them to federal laws that lack limitations periods of their
own."" Finally, the Court has held that the interstitial power
includes the authority to "delimit and set the contours of' judicially created causes of action."' As the following sections
show, none of these place markers provides a firm basis for
judicial creation of settlement bar rules in the securities context.
1. The Statute of Limitations Cases
While the first place marker, Texas Industries, provides
little support for courts' power to create a settlement bar rule,
the second place marker, the statute of limitations cases, might
seem more promising.
Statutes of limitation, like settlement bar rules, cut off
statutorily created rights. If courts have "interstitial" power to
cut off such rights by borrowing statutes of limitations, it can
be argued that they also have the power to adopt settlement
bar rules. This analogy, however, is too simplistic. It is generally accepted that a court's power to borrow statutes of limitations is based on congressional intent. Congress has been enacting private rights of action for over a century and it frequently omits limitations periods. Courts, however, have consistently supplied limitations periods by borrowing them from
state law and, more recently, from federal law. Accordingly,
when Congress passes a law without a statute of limitations, it
does not expect that the right of action it is creating will go
limitless. Rather, it expects and intends that courts will borrow
a limitations period from state or federal law." 8 The power
to borrow statutes of limitation is thus firmly grounded in congressional intent.
The same cannot be said of settlement bar rules. Congress
created the rights to contribution in question over fifty years
ago. Until Kaypro, the circuit courts which faced the issue had
consistently refused to apply any settlement bar rule."' Ac116. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987);
DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
117. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723.
118. Agenty Holding, 483 U.S. at 147; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-59; Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966); Holmber v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
119. See, e.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d
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cordingly, there is no basis to conclude that, when Congress
enacted or amended the securities laws, it expected the courts
to create such bar rules.12°
Moreover, in statute of limitation cases, courts borrow statutes, i.e. they adopt an existing limitations period from state
1 courts
law or other federal law. With minor exceptions,
which have adopted settlement bar rules have not borrowed
them but have created whatever rule the judge considered
optimal. The power of courts to create such new rules is far
more dubious than the congressionally sanctioned borrowing
of statutes of limitation which were in existence and generally
applicable at the time Congress created the given right of action.
E. The Authority to Extinguish Contribution Rights May Depend
on Whether Those Rights Are Statutorily Created or Judicially
Implied
Since the statute of limitations analogy does not support
the existence of any "interstitial power" to create settlement
bar rules, it is necessary to examine this power further.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores," the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether persons who were not purchasers or sellers of a security could be plaintiffs in a 10b-5
action. After examining the statutory history, the Court held
that only purchasers and sellers could be plaintiffs. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court noted that since the 10b-5 right of
action had been judicially created, it would have to be judicially delimited:
We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action for damages, the duty of
the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which
Congress enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right

which Congress has conferred because of any disagreement it
might have with Congress about the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability. But as we have pointed out, we are not
dealing here with any private right created by the express
672, 675 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558
120. See 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
121. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Oppenheim,
Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D. N.Y. 1986).
122. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.

(th Cir. 1987).
49.09, at 200.
Appel, Dixon, 631 F.
723 (1975).

684

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

language of 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. No language in either of
those provisions speaks at all to the contours of a private
cause of action for their violation .... [W]e are dealing
with a private cause of action which has been judiciallyfound to
I delimited one way or
exist and which will have to be judicially
....
another

Several of the rights to contribution under the securities
laws were expressly created by Congress. 4 Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Blue Chip suggests that courts' power to
"circumscribe" these rights is very limited. A settlement bar
rule would not merely circumscribe these rights, it would summarily eliminate them, prior to trial. Accordingly, a court's
power to adopt such rules in the face of an expressly legislated
right to contribution is very dubious.
The right to contribution under Rule 10b-5 was, of course,
judicially created, and the Blue Chip holding therefore gives
courts the power to delimit and set the contours of this right.
This power is not unlimited. The right to contribution implied
under Rule 10b-5 arises from Congress' specific intent to afford a right of contribution to persons sued under the securities laws. ' " While courts have power to fill in the interstices
surrounding this remedy, it is less clear that they have the
power to overrule the will of Congress and extinguish this
right without a trial.
With regard to settlement bar rules under Rule 10b-5,
then, we return to the same question: in adopting such a rule,
does a court merely delimit, set contours, and fill interstices of
the law? Or is it performing a much more serious judicial calisthenic, similar to the creation of the right of contribution rejected in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries? The answers to
these questions may vary according to which judgment reduction rule is chosen. As the next section will show, a court's
exercise of power is much more limited when it extinguishes a

123. I& at 748-49 (emphasis added).

124. See §§ 11, 12(1), 12(2) of the Securities Act and § 18 of the Exchange
Act.
125. See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (fth Cir. 1987); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 558 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1971); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318 F.
Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affYd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971). But
see In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn.
1988).
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right under the proportional reduction rule than when it does
so under the pro tanto rule.
F. A Settlement Bar Entered Under the Pro Tanto Rule Involves a
Greater Use of Judicial Power than One Entered Under the Proportional Reduction Rule
Under the pro tanto rule, the non-settling defendant's
rights to contribution are extinguished, often after a summary,
pre-trial good faith hearing. " The non-settling defendant is
therefore deprived of a trial on his right to contribution and
may have to pay huge sums to plaintiff which, under the securities laws, he should have been able to recover in contribution
from his co-defendants. If measured by its effect on the parties
and on federally created rights, the pro tanto rule amounts to a
rather drastic exercise of judicial power.
Under the proportional reduction rule, in contrast, the
non-settling party is not deprived of a trial on its rights to contribution. On the contrary, he can go to trial and argue to a
jury, as he would in a contribution action, that the settling
defendant is responsible for part of the plaintiffs damages. As
with contribution, the non-settling defendant does not have to
pay the portion of damages attributable to his settling
co-defendants; that portion is deducted from the judgment
against him. Accordingly, in most cases, the proportional reduction rule has a far more limited effect on congressionally
created contribution rights, and in creating this rule, judges
are, arguably, merely setting the contours of the law.
However, in some cases involving an insolvent non- settling defendant, extinguishing contribution rights can be very
costly to other solvent, non-settling defendants, even if the
proportional reduction rule is applied. The following example
illustrates the problem.
Assume that SD, NSD-1 and NSD-2 are liable to plaintiff
under the securities laws for a $100,000 loss. SD settles by
paying $10,000 and a settlement bar is entered. Plaintiff goes
to trial against NSD-1 and NSD-2. The jury sets plaintiff's dam-

126. This is the statutorily mandated procedure in California (CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 877.6 (Deering 1991)). In addition, this procedure has been used by some
federal district courts. See, e.g., In rm Nucorp Energy Sec. Utig., 661 F. Supp. 1403
(S.D. Cal. 1987).
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ages at $100,000 and finds that SD is 10% liable, NSD-1 is 10%
liable, and NSD-2 is 80% liable. Under the proportional reduction rule, the $100,000 judgment is reduced by the 10% of
fault attributable to SD. A $90,000 judgment is therefore entered against NSD-1 and NSD-2. Assume, however, that NSD-2
is insolvent. NSD-1, whose contribution rights have been extinguished, must pay $90,000, representing his own share of the
damages ($10,000) plus (because of joint and several liability)
all of NSD-2's share ($80,000). Without the settlement bar,
NSD-1 would need to pay only $50,000 (his $10,000 share and
half of NSD- 2's share) because NSD-1 could recover the remaining half of NSD-2's share in contribution from SD.
Thus, while the proportional judgment reduction rule is a
lesser exercise of judicial authority than the pro tanto rule, in
some instances even the proportional reduction rule will result
in the destruction of important congressionally created rights
to contribution.
In cases where all the defendants are solvent, however, the
non-settling defendant is not harmed in any substantive way by
application of the proportional reduction rule. Such a defendant retains the right to a trial where he can shift his liability
to the settling defendants. The application of the proportional
reduction rule will only affect the timing and composition of
that trial. Since the power to control the timing and composition of trials falls within the interstitial powers of the court,
judges may have the power to apply a proportional reduction
rule in cases where all defendants are solvent.
The varied results of the above analysis can be summarized as follows.
First, courts' interstitial power gives them some leeway in
fashioning rules that affect judicially implied rights (as opposed
to statutorily created rights). Accordingly, courts may have the
power to apply the pro tanto rule or the proportional reduction
rule to the judicially implied right of contribution under Rule
lOb-5.
Second, courts' interstitial power does not include the
authority to extinguish statutorily created rights. Accordingly,
courts lack the power to extinguish statutorily created contribution rights.
Third, in cases where all defendants are solvent, the proportional reduction rule does not deprive non-settling defendants of their statutorily created rights because, at trial, the
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non-settling defendant's liability will be limited to his share of
the fault. Accordingly, in such cases, courts may have the power to apply the proportional reduction rule to statutory or
judicially implied contribution claims.
Lastly, in cases where a defendant is insolvent, the proportional reduction rule will extinguish the contribution rights of
a non-settling defendant who must pay damages caused by the
insolvent non-settling co-defendant. Consequently, in cases involving insolvent defendants, courts lack the power to apply
the proportional reduction rule at least to statutory claims,
because doing so would deprive the non-settling defendant of
his statutory right to obtain full contribution.
In many securities actions, the plaintiffs file claims based
on both statutory and judicially implied causes of action.'" In
most cases, at least one of the defendants is insolvent. In addition, many cases contain pendent state law claims. Applying
the list of rules set forth above to any securities case could
therefore result in significant confusion.
One way of avoiding this confusion would be for the
judge in each case to adopt one settlement bar rule from the
law of the forum state and apply it to all of the claims in the
case. The following sections discuss the applicability of state
settlement bar rules.
G.

The Applicability of State Law

In the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent concerning what courts should do when an aspect of a
statute has not been fleshed out, it may be appropriate for
them to apply state law. This section discusses (1) cases which
hold that courts should apply state law when filling in the interstices in a federal law, except in cases where a uniform national rule is necessary, (2) an approach suggested by Justice
Scalia for adopting state law, and (3) the Rules of Decision Act,
which may require courts to apply state law rules. The article
concludes that courts should apply state settlement bar rules if
they are applicable.

127. Se4 e.g., In rv Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal.
1987).
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1. Federal Courts Must Use State Laws to Fill in Interstices in
Federal Statutes, Unless a Uniform NationalRule Is Necessary
As the previous sections explain, courts have traditionally
applied federal common law to fill in the gaps or interstices in
federal statutory schemes. Those sections also note that creation of settlement bar rules involves extinguishing congressionally created rights and that courts' "interstitial power" may
not be sufficient to permit them to create rules with so drastic
an effect. For the purposes of this section, it is assumed that
this interstitial authority does empower courts to create settlement bar rules. Given this assumption, this article concludes
that courts should borrow these rules from state law.
The recent case of Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc.'" is instructive. There, plaintiff Kamen filed a class action
suit against defendant Kemper, alleging violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"). The district court
dismissed the suit because the plaintiff failed to make a
pre-litigation demand on Kemper's board of directors."s In
affirming dismissal of Kamen's suit, the Seventh Circuit used
its common law powers to adopt a "universal demand rule."
This rule required any plaintiff suing a company under the
ICA to make a pre-litigation demand on the company, whether
or not the demand would be futile.' On certiorari, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the circuit court
had properly adopted this rule or whether it should have applied Maryland's law, which contains an exception for cases
where pre-litigation demands against a company are futile. The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, concluding that rules regarding pre-litigation demands should be borrowed from state law.
Writing for an unanimous court, Justice Marshall first
noted that because the ICA was a federal statute "any common

128. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (West 1976).
130. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1713. Such demands are not required by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, however, requires plaintiffs to allege the pre- litigation efforts they have made to obtain the
action they desire from the defendant company. Rule 23.1 does not specifically
mandate pre-litigation demands in all cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
131. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1713.
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law rule necessary to effectuate a private cause of action under
that statute is necessarily federal in character.""2 Justice Marshall went on to observe that it "does not follow, however, that
the content of such a rule must be wholly the product of a federal court's own devising."'" He concluded that the federal
courts should "fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes
with uniform federal rules only (in cases where):
(1) the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for
nationwide legal standards; or
(2) express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the
matter at hand."'"
Only the first of these factors is relevant to the issue of
Accordingly, pursuant to Kamen,
settlement bar rules.'
courts must adopt state settlement bar rules, unless there is a
distinct need for a uniform nationwide settlement bar rule.
Certain commentators have concluded that a uniform
national rule is needed to prevent forum shopping." These
commentators note that differing settlement bar rules may
have vastly different effects on plaintiffs and,"7 if settlement

132. Id. at 1717.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The second factor is inapplicable because there are no express provisions
in analogous federal laws in which Congress chooses one settlement bar rule over
another. Most statutes are silent as to such rules. While congress did include a
pro tanto rule in the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, 9613 (West 1988), this rule applies only to
settlements entered into with, and approved by, state or federal agencies. It therefore bears little relevance to private suits filed under the securities laws. In fact,
several district courts have refused to apply the pro tanto rule to private suits filed
under CERCLA. See, e.g. Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 690
F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying the proportional reduction rule to private
settlements of CERCLA cases). CERCLA, unlike the Securities Acts, provides that
contribution claims "shall be governed by federal law." 42 U.S.C. § 9612(e)(1).
Nevertheless, in concluding that a "uniform federal rule should be adopted,"
Lyncott at 1417, Lyncott and similar CERCLA cases do not adequately discuss why
courts have the power to adopt such a settlement bar rule. This question is especially troubling in the CERCLA context, where these courts are "adopting" a different rule than the one which congress expressly placed in the statute. Cf. Lampf
v. Gilbertson, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991).
136. William Bruce Davis, Note, Multiple Defendant Settlement in lob-5: Good
Faith Contribution Bar, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1253 (1989); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F.
Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
137. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (Section IV) for a discussion of the burdens which the proportional reduction rule places on plaintiffs.
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bar rules are borrowed from state law, some plaintiffs may
choose to file their suits in the state which has the most favorable settlement bar rule. It is doubtful, however, that this
threat of forum shopping is sufficient to warrant a uniform
national rule. Rules of venue and jurisdiction and the simple
economics of hiring a lawyer in a distant state can be expected
to limit forum shopping to some extent. Moreover, adoption
of state law creates benefits which outweigh any advantages
offered by a uniform federal rule.
First, if state law is adopted, the same rule will apply to
federal and pendent claims in any given case. This will prevent
the problems that can arise in cases where one settlement bar
rule applies to the federal claims and another applies to the
pendent state claims. The problem of forum shopping may
pale in comparison to the law-shopping that could occur in
such cases, as the parties attempt to attribute their losses to a
federal claim or to a state claim to take advantage of whichever
settlement bar rule is more favorable to them.
Second, the states in which the bulk of these cases will
arise have specific statutory procedures applicable to settlement bar rules." These procedures are more developed and
efficient than any rules that federal courts may invent using
their common law interstitial power.
Finally, until the Supreme Court or Congress enunciates a
single federal rule, the circuits are likely to choose differing
settlement bar systems. Forum shopping among the circuits is
likely.
For these reasons, the need for one national legal standard does not appear to be compelling. Assuming courts have
the common law "interstitial" power to create settlement bar
rules, they should borrow these rules from applicable state law.
2. Justice Scalia's Approach Suggests that State Settlement Bar
Rules Should Be Applied
Justice Scalia has suggested a five step approach for determining whether state law may be applicable to cases brought
under federal law.s9 While arguing this approach was the

138.

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (Deering 1991); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.

LAW §§ 15-108 (1978).
139.

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 161-64
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original basis for federal courts' borrowing of state statutes of
limitations, he concedes it is no longer the basis for borrowing
them. This is because Scalia's approach has been superseded
by reliance on congressional expectation that courts will borrow existing state statutes of limitations. However, since no
congressional intent is apparent with respect to settlement bar
rules, Scalia's five step approach is worth examining.
Scalia first notes that state rules "whose terms appear to
cover federal statutory causes of action apply as a matter of
state law to such claims, even though the state legislature that
enacted the statutes did not have those claims in mind."'40
On its face, the California settlement bar statute applies to any
settlement where "one or more co- obligors [are] mutually
subject to the same contribution rights."'4' On its face, then,
the California settlement bar statute applies to contribution
claims under the federal securities laws.
Second, Scalia notes that imposition of the state rule is
"within the States' powers, if not pre-empted by Congress.""
Thus, in the California instance, the state has the power to
enact settlement bar rules which apply to federal contribution
rights unless that power is preempted.
Scalia's third point is that the obligation to apply state
rules "does not spring from Congress' intent in enacting the
federal statute. Rather, that intent is relevant only to the question whether the state [rule] had been pre-empted by
Congress' failure to provide one."' In the case of settlement
bar, Congress expressly created four rights of contribution and
implied another right Under Rule lOb-5. However, Congress
was silent as to settlement bar and as to the goals of settlement
which motivate the settlement bar rule. Conceivably, this silence may establish congressional intent to pre-empt state settlement bar statutes. However, if Congress' intent was to prohibit settlement bar rules, this intent would be sufficient to
preclude federal judges from creating settlement bar rules of
their own.

(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 161.
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (Deering 1991).
142. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 161 (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 614-15, 618-20 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830)).
143. Id. at 162 (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 619 (1895)).
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Fourth, Scalia addresses this question of Congressional
silence and observes that "Congressional silence on the...
issue is ordinarily insufficient" to preempt state statutes; "special provision" by Congress is required to do that.'"
Congress' silence as to settlement bar rules is thus probably
insufficient to preempt state settlement bar laws.
Finally, "the federal statute - its substantive provisions
rather than its mere silence - may be sufficient to pre-empt a
state statute that discriminates against federal rights or [does
not] permit the federal right to be vindicated."" It is possible that settlement bar rules preclude the vindication of contribution rights under the securities laws (by extinguishing these
rights prior to trial). Under Justice Scalia's reasoning, the state
settlement bar rules would therefore be preempted. However,
by the same reasoning, federal courts probably lack the interstitial power to create such rules because this power does not
permit them to create rules which preclude the vindication of
the federal rights in question.
Justice Scalia's analysis thus yields two possible results.
First, the better analysis is that applicable state settlement bar
rules have not been preempted and that they apply to contribution claims under federal securities laws. If this is the case,
federal courts should borrow these rules rather than creating
rules of their own.
Alternatively, state settlement bar rules are preempted
because they conflict with congressional intent to allow contribution among liable parties and because they undermine federally created contribution rights. If this is the case, however,
settlement bar rules are sufficiently at odds with the congressional intent and statutory purpose that they may not be
adopted by federal judges exercising their interstitial powers.
3.

The Rules of Decision Act

Further support for applying state law settlement bar rules
is found in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, commonly
known as the Rules of Decision Act. While this federal statute

144. I
at 162 (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895);
McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 276-77 (1830)).
145. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 162 (citing Campbell v Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 614, 615 (1895) (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
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is facially quite relevant to the settlement bar issue, it has been
virtually ignored by the courts and commentators who have
addressed the issue. The Rules of Decision Act provides,
"[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution
or treaties of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions in civil actions in
the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."'
If given a literal reading, this language would mandate use
of state settlement bar laws. The Constitution, treaties and
statutes of the United States are silent as to whether a settlement bar rule should apply to contribution actions under the
securities laws. Thus, the laws of the states should provide the
rules of decision on this issue.
The applicability of the Act to settlement bar rules may,
however, turn on how broadly the Court reads the language
"except where the constitution or treaties of the United States
shall otherwise require or provide." 4 ' The Supreme Court
has read this exception with varying degrees of expansiveness.
One reading arises in a footnote in DelCostello v. Teamsters."' In that case, the Court was asked to determine the
proper limitations period for suits by an employee against an
employer or union under 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).' The Court
noted that the usual practice when a federal statute lacked a
limitations period was for the Court to borrow the most
closely analogous state law limitations period." The Court
held that there was no state law closely analogous to the federal claims available under the section in question. Furthermore,
the most comparable state limitations period would be in conflict with the congressionally stated intent of providing rapid
resolution of labor disputes. 5 The Court concluded that
Congress would not intend courts to borrow a state statute
when it undermined the purpose of a federal law.' Therefore, it refused to borrow state law and instead borrowed the

146.
147.
148.
(1983).
149.
150.
151.
152.

Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (West 1988).

Id.
DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

Id
I&
I&
Id.

at
at
at
at

154.
158.
167-68.
161.

159 n.13

694

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

limitations period from section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
In footnote 13 of DelCostello, the Court concluded that the
Rules of Decision Act did not require the federal courts to
apply state law, noting that the Act authorizes "application of
state law only when federal law does not 'otherwise require or
'
The footnote went on to construe the terms
provide. ""
"otherwise require or provide" in an extremely broad way:
[T]he choice of a limitations period for a federal cause of
action is itself a question of federal law. If the answer to
that question (based on the policies and requirements of the
underlying cause of action) is that a timeliness rule drawn
from elsewhere in federal law should be applied, then the
Rules of Decision Act is inapplicable by its own terms."
Under this reasoning, no specific statute or congressional
intent is needed to permit a court to use a federal rather than
a state rule. The fact that the "polices and requirements" of
the federal cause of action require a federal rule of decision is
sufficient to override the Rules of Decision Act requirement
that state rules be used. Thus, whenever federal courts feel
that federal limitations periods better fulfill the policies and
requirements of an act, these periods can be used in place of
state ones. Under the DelCostello footnote, this would apparently be true even with respect to rules created by federal judges
to fill interstices in the law. Footnote 13 thus continues:
[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts. 'At the very least, effective
Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the
federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or
"judicial legislation," rules which may be necessary to fill in
interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns
enacted in the large by Congress."'
When the Supreme Court next addressed the issue of
what statute of limitations to apply, to a complicated federal
153. Id. at 159 n.13.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 159-60 n.13 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Miser Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957)).
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statute, the opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, one of
dissenters in DelCostello, and the Court apparently took a subtle step back from footnote 13.
In Agency Holding,'" the Court was asked to determine
what statute of limitations is applicable to cases filed under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' The Court concluded that borrowing a state law statute of limitations would be inappropriate because RICO was
unlike any state law cause of action and applying state law
would cause great confusion and uncertainty. Under footnote
13, it could have adopted a statute of limitations from a similar
federal statute on the sole grounds that the "policies and requirements" of RICO required it to do so. The Court, however, did not base its holding on such reasoning.
Instead, Justice O'Connor emphasized language. in
DelCostello in which the Court based its borrowing of federal
law on a finding of congressional intent.'" She noted that
when Congress passes statutes without limitations periods, it
generally intends for courts to borrow the most analogous
state law period, but where the state statutes of limitations are
"unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law it
may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose
to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of
federal substantive law."""
Under Agency Holding, a finding that the state law is inconsistent with congressional intent may be necessary before a
court adopts a federal rule of decision rather than a state one.
If DelCostello's footnote 13 is a correct statement of the
law, it is possible that the courts have interstitial power to reject state law and create their own settlement bar rule if the
"policies and requirements" of the federal securities laws require it. As noted above, however, the securities laws specifically enunciate a right of contribution and they do not set forth
any policy of encouraging settlement at the expense of those
rights. While other federal statutes and rules recognize the
importance of settlement, even under DelCostello, it is not
readily apparent that this policy is sufficient to warrant judicial

156.
157.
158.
159.

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1990).
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147.
I&

696

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

creation of rules which extinguish these statutorily created
rights.
If the Agency Holdings interpretation is applied and some
expression of congressional intent is required before courts
are permitted to ignore the Rules of Decision Act and create
interstitial federal rules of their own, it is very unlikely that
federal courts have the power to create settlement bar rules of
their own."w The securities laws are silent as to the issue and
during the time since they became law Congress has maintained silence on the matter, while some states have enacted
settlement bar rules and others have not. Thus, there is little
basis upon which to divine Congress' intent in failing to enact
a settlement bar for securities cases. In the absence of any ascertainable congressional intent, courts would be required to
adopt applicable state law settlement bar rules.
H. The Choice of a Settlement Bar Rule Is a Decision that Should
Be Made by Congress
Given the lack of expression of congressional intent on
this point and the many competing policy considerations on
both sides, the question of whether and how to fashion a settlement bar rule is one best answered by Congress.
In concluding his opinion in Texas Industries, Chief Justice
Burger noted:
The range of factors to be weighed in deciding whether a
right to contribution should exist demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial resolution of this complex issue.
Ascertaining what is "fair" in this setting calls for inquiry
into the entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the
elements of a particular case or category of cases. Similarly, whether contribution would strengthen or weaken enforcement of the antitrust laws, or what form a right to
contribution should take, cannot be resolved without go-

160. If one assumes that settlement bar rules were intended by Congress, then
courts may be justified in creating federal rules, rather than adopting state ones.
The reasoning would be similar to the statute of limitations reasoning in Agency
Holding. State settlement bar rules vary from state to state, some states have no
rules (some states have no right to contribution) and application of state rules
would thus be confusing. Since Congress would not intend the adoption of confusing rules, it would have intended judges to create uniform national settlement
bar rules.
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ing beyond the record of a single lawsuit.'"
As the later sections of this article will show, an immense
range of factors must be weighed in deciding which contribution rule to adopt. Resolution of this problem is, therefore,
better left to Congress.
Prior to suggesting what kind of rule Congress should
adopt, it is necessary to examine the alternatives. While the
merits of the pro tanto rule have been discussed in detail, the
proportional reduction rule has not been examined as closely.
Accordingly, the next section will examine important aspects
of the proportional reduction rule in greater detail.

IV. THE MERrrs OF THE PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION RULE
The courts and commentators who have discussed the
relative merits of the pro tanto and proportional reduction
rules have passed over some important considerations which
must be taken into account before courts or Congress choose
one rule over the other. This section examines some of these
considerations.
Part A discusses deterrence and concludes that in most
cases the pro tanto and proportional reduction rules should
deter fraud and deceit to roughly the same extent. However,
there is one significant exception. The proportional reduction
rule provides substantially less deterrence to minor participants
in securities transactions.
Part B will discuss why adoption of the proportional reduction rule will discourage certain kinds of settlements.
Part C deals with judicial economy and notes that the
proportional reduction rule eliminates the costly and time
consuming pre-trial hearing which is often required under the
pro tanto scheme. However, part C concludes that many of the
issues that would have been raised at that hearing are simply
deferred until the plaintiffs' trial against the non- settling defendant and that there is no net savings of judicial time or
effort.
Section D examines the special burdens which the proportional reduction rule places on the plaintiff.

161. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials Inc., 451 U.S 630, 646-47 (1981).
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A. Deterrence
A major goal of contribution is deterrence, that is, to deter participants in securities transactions from fraudulent conduct.'"' Surprisingly, this goal is not discussed in much detail
by the courts or commentators who propose a proportional
judgment reduction rule. Adoption of such a rule, however,
can make vast differences in the way damages are allocated
among settling and non-settling defendants. Such differences
are bound to have differing deterrent effects on the conduct
of parties who might, someday, be the targets of a securities
action. The extent of these differences is not easy to gauge.
A useful exploration of the differing deterrent effects of
the pro tanto and proportional reduction approaches is possible
if certain distinctions are drawn between the actors who may
be deterred by the securities laws. Thus, in examining ihe difference between the two approaches, one should distinguish
"major" from "minor" participants in securities fraud
schemes.'" Typically, a major participant will be a corporate
"insider" who, on a comparative negligence basis, will be responsible for a large percentage of the damages suffered by
plaintiffs. A minor participant would likely be a law firm, bank,
accounting firm or securities underwriter, who might be guilty
of passing on an untruth created by the major participant.
In evaluating the deterrent effect of the pro tanto and proportional reduction approaches, a distinction should also be
made between "risk neutral" and "risk averse" parties. A risk
neutral party takes into account only the predicted value of a
potential risk. This is the magnitude of the risk multiplied by
its probability. Thus, a risk neutral party would be indifferent
between a 100% certainty of losing $250,000, and a 25%
chance of losing $1,000,000, since the predicted value of both

162. See, e.g., Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 550 (D. Colo.

1989); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Adam S.

lOb-5
Affleck, Note, Apportioning Contribution in Section 10(b) and Rul
MultiDefendant Suits: A Crtique of Relative Culpability Shares in the Wake of Smith v.
Mulvaney, 1988 B.Y.U. L REv 409, 419 (1988).

163. This distinction was first made by Professor Adamski in differentiating be-

tween the deterrent effects of contribution based on pro rata and proportional

fault systems. See .M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty
Actions Under Rul lOb.5, 66 IowA L REV. 533, 558 (1981).
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losses is the same (100% x $250,000 = $250,000; 25% x

$1,000,000 = $250,000).
A risk averse party is more influenced by the total magnitude of the risk. Thus, in the situation described above, the
risk averse party would not be indifferent between the two
risks. Rather, he would take into account that the magnitude
of the risk posed by the first alternative is $250,000 and that
posed by the second is $1,000,000. The risk averse party would
avoid the second situation because, while the predicted value
of the two risks is the same, the magnitude of the second risk
is larger.
This section will compare the difference between the pro
tanto and proportional judgment reduction rules as that difference affects major and minor participants and risk neutral
and risk averse parties. First, this will be done mathematically,
based on certain arbitrary assumptions and simple probabilities."' This section will discuss the intuitive reasons for the
mathematical results.
Comparison of the deterrent effects of the two judgment
reduction rules will be based on the following assumptions:
1. An alleged securities fraud will cause $1,000,000 in
damages to plaintiffs.
2. Eighty percent of these damages will be attributable to
the major participants in the fraud and 20% will be attributable to the minor participants.
3. There is a 50% chance that the fraud will be detected
and that plaintiffs will recover the $1,000,000 at trial.
4. Under the pro tanto rule, any settlement will be subject
to a "good faith" test with a "ball park" standard as to the
fairness of the settlement amount paid by the settling defendant. Under this ballpark standard, courts will reject any settlement in which the settling defendant pays less than 25% of
his fair share of the damages. Settling defendants will act efficiently and will therefore pay 25% of their fair share of the
damages in order to settle out of the case.

164. For a more sophisticated exercise calculating the deterrent effect of various rules of contribution and "no contribution," see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic
Anaysis, 33 STAN. L REV. 447 (1981).
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5. The jury will efficiently allocate damages and all defendants will be solvent and fully able to pay any verdict entered
against them.
1. Deterrence to Major Participants
a. The ProportionalReduction Rule (Deterrence to Major
Participant)
Using these assumptions, the deterrence which the proportional reduction rule poses to a major participant will be
calculated as follows: The extent of the damages is $1,000,000.
If the case goes to the jury, the major participant's share of
these damages will be 80%, or $800,000. Plaintiff is unlikely to
settle with the major participant for much less than this
amount because, under the proportional reduction rule, plaintiff will have to absorb any shortfall herself (since the major
defendant's 80% of fault would be deducted from any judgment plaintiff obtains against the non-settling minor defendants).
The major participant's share of the damages is thus likely
to be 80% of $1,000,000 or $800,000. The major participant
knows that he faces a 50% risk of being caught and successfully sued. The predicted loss, or deterrence, presented to the major participant under the proportional reduction rule is his
$800,000 share of the damages multiplied by the 50% probability of suffering that loss, or $400,000. The magnitude of the
possible loss is $800,000.
b. The
Participants

Pro Tanto Rule (Deterrence to Major)

While the same assumptions will be used to calculate the
deterrence posed to major participants by the pro tanto rule, it
is necessary to make further assumptions, which were unnecessary above, regarding which party settles first.
The pro tanto rule gives both plaintiffs and major participants the incentive to enter into an early settlement. The major participant will want to settle first in hopes of paying less
than his fair share of the damages, leaving the minor defendant to pay the balance after trial. The plaintiff may believe
that settling with the major participant first is a good settlement tactic because it increases settlement pressure on the
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minor defendant, who is left alone to face the bulk of the damages in the case.
For the sake of discussion, percentage probabilities have
been assigned to three different settlement or trial scenarios
and an attempt to estimate deterrence by a simple evaluation
of these probabilities will be made:
(a) There is a 20% chance that the major participant will
settle first by paying plaintiff $200,000, the minimum amount
that the court will approve under the good faith "ballpark"
test.'6
(b) There is a 20% chance that the case will go to trial and
the major participant will pay $800,000, his 80% share of the
damages.
(c) There is a 10% chance that the minor participant will
settle first by paying plaintiff $50,000, the minimum amount
that the court will approve under the good faith "ballpark"
test. 17 This will leave the major defendant to pay the remaining $950,000.
(d) In line with assumption three, above, there is a 50%
chance that the fraud will not be detected or that plaintiff will
not prevail at trial.
Deterrence could then be roughly estimated as follows.
Under assumption (a), the major participant faces a 20% probability of paying $200,000 in settlement. The predicted value
of the risk is 20% x $200,000 or $40,000.
Under assumption (b), the major participant faces a 20%
probability of paying $800,000 after trial. The predicted value
of this risk is 20% x $800,000 or $160,000.

165. The percentages are based on the assumption that it is more likely for
the major participants to settle first. The reasons for this assumption are discussed
throughout the section. These percentages represent the risks that exist at the
time the fraud is contemplated.
166. Under assumption four at page 90, using the pro tanto rule, courts will allow settling a defendant to escape the action if he pays at least 25% of his share
of the damages. Here, 25% of major defendant's $800,000 share of the damages is
$200,000.
167. As noted in the previous footnote, under assumption four, courts will
reject any settlement in which the settling defendant pays less than 25% of his
own fair share of the damages. Here, 25% of the Minor Participant's $200,000
share of the damages is $50,000.
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Under assumption (c), the major participant faces a 10%
probability of paying $950,000 after trial. The predicted value
of this risk is 10% x $950,000 or $ 95,000.
Under assumption (d), the major participant faces a 50%
probability that the fraud will not be detected and he will pay
nothing. The predicted value of this risk is 50% x 0 or $0.
The predicted value of the major participant's loss will
thus be: $40,000 + $160,000 + $95,000 + $0 or $295,000.'"
The magnitude of the risk will be the $950,000 that the major
participant must pay if the minor defendant settles first.
In summary, this is a comparison of the deterrence posed
to the major defendant under the assumed facts:
MAJOR DEFENDANTS
PROPORTIONAL
PRO TANTO
REDUCTION

Predicted value of
loss (i.e. deterrence
to risk neutral actor):

$400,000

$295,000

Magnitude of possible
loss (to be considered
by risk averse actors):

$800,000

$950,000

A risk neutral major participant is thus moderately more
deterred by the proportional reduction system because this
system makes it more likely that he will pay his fair share of
the damages.
The effect on a risk averse party, however, is mixed. While
the predicted loss posed under the pro tanto system is less than
that posed under the proportional reduction rule, the total
possible loss is greater. Since it is unclear whether potential
major defendants in securities actions are risk neutral or risk
averse,'" it is impossible to say whether moderately differing

168. While the various alternatives cannot occur at the same time, it is
to add the probabilities because the result yields the total probable risk
time of the securities transaction. At that time, the major participant faces
risk of losing $950,000, a 30% risk of losing at least $800,000 and a 50%
losing at least $200,000. Averaging the risks, the major participant faces
risk of losing $590,000, or a risk of $295,000.
169. See, Polinsky & Shavell, supm note 164.

proper
at the
a 10%
risk of
a 50%
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deterrent values caused by the two rules will have any real
effect on these potential major defendants.
Intuitively, these results are logical. On balance, the pro
tanto rule poses somewhat less deterrence to major participants
because it gives them the opportunity to settle out cheaply and
pass a large portion of their liability to non-settling minor defendants. True, in some cases, the opposite will occur and the
minor participants will settle first, shifting some of their liability to the major defendant. For the major participant, however,
the possible benefits of passing a large portion of liability to
the minor defendants will exceed the risks of absorbing some
of the smaller damages which the minor defendants may cause.
The probable costs to major defendants are thus likely to be
slightly less under the pro tanto rule.
2.

Deterrence to Minor Participants

The difference between the two approaches to settlement
reduction has a far greater effect on minor participants.
a. The ProportionalReduction Rule (Deterrence to Minor
Participants)
Using the assumptions, the deterrence which the proportional reduction rule poses to the minor participant will be
calculated as follows: The damages are $1,000,000. If the case
goes to the jury, the minor participant's share of these damages will be 20%,1" or $200,000. Plaintiff is unlikely to accept
less than this amount in settlement because she will have to
absorb any shortfall herself. The minor participant's share of
the damages is thus likely to be 20% of $1,000,000 or
$200,000. The minor participant knows that he faces a 50%
risk of being caught and successfully sued. The predicted loss,
or deterrence, presented to the minor participant under the
proportional reduction rule is thus his $200,000 share of the
damages multiplied by the 50% probability of suffering that
loss or $100,000. The magnitude of the possible loss is
$200,000.

170. See supra text accompanying note 164 (assumption two) stating that 80%
of the damages will be attributable to the "major" participants in the fraud and
20% will be attributable to the "minor" participants.
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(Deterrence to Minor

Applying the added assumptions for the pro tanto rule,
deterrence would be calculated as follows:
Under assumption (a), there is a 20% chance that the
major defendant would settle first for $200,000,7 leaving the
minor participant to pay the remaining $800,000. The predicted loss to the minor participant is 20% x $800,000 or
$160,000.
Under assumption (b), there is a 20% chance that the
matter will go to trial and the minor participant will be ordered to pay his $200,000 share of the damages. The predicted
loss to the minor participant is 20% x $200,000 or $40,000.
Under assumption (c), there is a 10% chance that the minor participant will settle first for $50,000.' The predicted
loss is therefore 10% x $50,000: $5,000.
Under assumption (d), there is a 50% chance that the
minor participant will pay nothing. The predicted loss is therefore 50% x 0 or $0.
The predicted loss to the minor participant is thus $160,000
+ $40,000 + $5,000 + $0, or $205,000. The magnitude of risk to
the minor participant under the pro tanto rule is $800,000. This
is the amount he must pay if he is left to pay the remaining
damages after the major participant settles out for $200,000.
In summary, this is a comparison of the deterrence posed
to the minor defendant under the assumed facts:

171. Under assumption (4), this is the minimum settlement amount the major
participant can pay while still satisfying the "ballpark" test (25% x major
participants' $800,000 share of damages = $200,000).
172. Under assumption (4), this is the minimum amount the court will approve under the "ball park" test (25% x $200,000 = $50,000).
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MINOR DEFENDANTS
PROPORTIONAL
REDUCTION

PRO TANTO

Predicted value of
loss (i.e. deterrence
to risk neutral actor):

$100,000

$205,000

Magnitude of possible
loss (to be considered
by risk averse actors):

$200,000

$800,000

The pro tanto rule thus presents twice as much deterrence
to the risk neutral minor participant as does the proportional
reduction method. In the case of a risk adverse defendant, the
magnitude of the risk presented by the pro tanto method is
$800,000, four times the risk presented by the proportional
reduction method. The pro tanto approach presents significantly more deterrence to minor participants, whether they are risk
neutral or risk averse.
3. The Pro Tanto System Threatens Minor Participants
With Huge Liability
Intuitively, these results are not surprising. Under the pro
tanto rule, if plaintiff decides to enter into a cheap settlement
with the major participant in order to fund the litigation, the
non-settling minor defendants face the prospect of paying any
inadequacy in this settlement. At least two courts have recognized that this prospect gives the "guiltier defendant" great
incentive to "get off cheaply by settling first. " "h

a.

The Nucorp Example

The Nucorp Energy'74 litigation presents a case study of
the risk and deterrence presented to minor defendants if the
plaintiff settles first with the major participant. There, the
plaintiffs, who estimated their "baseline" damages at $230 million, settled with the major participants first for $41 mil-

173. Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 552 (D. Colo. 1989); In re
Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
174. In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
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lion."5 The court approved this settlement, extinguished the
contribution rights of the non- settling defendants and adopted a pro tanto reduction standard. 7 The minor participant
defendants (a bank, a securities underwriting firm, and a big
eight accounting firm) were thus exposed to liability for the
remaining "baseline" damages of $189 million.'"
Under the pro tanto rule, law firms, accounting firms, and
other professionals know that the settlement process may play
out this way. A client may become a major defendant in a
securities case and may settle out of the ensuing litigation first,
leaving the professionals "holding the bag" for the vast bulk of
damages. This possibility is likely to present significant deterrence to "minor" defendants.
If the proportional reduction rule is adopted, the settlement process cannot play out in this way. First, the minor
defendant is less likely to be left out in the cold during the
settlement process. In fact, if the plaintiff needs a settlement to
fund the litigation, he will probably prefer to settle with the
minor defendant first. This is because plaintiff takes a larger
risk in settling with the major participant. Since the major
participant's portion of damages is greater, underestimation of
these damages, and the resulting loss when the major
defendant's proportional fault is deducted from the verdict,
could be very costly to the plaintiff.
Second, and more importantly, if the minor defendant
does find himself in the position of a non-settling defendant,
he is not in quite as unfortunate a situation as he would be
under the pro tanto rule. At trial, he will have the opportunity
to prove his own innocence and to prove that all liability
should be shifted to the settling major participant, who will
likely appear at trial as an empty chair.
The proportional reduction rule thus gives the minor
defendant every opportunity to limit his liability to his minor
share of fault. The pro tanto system, in contrast, threatens to
burden minor defendants with huge damages caused by others. This threat is likely to be an appreciable deterrent to unlawful conduct by minor participants in securities transactions.

175. 1& at 1409.
176. IM.at 1405-06.
177. Id.at 1409.
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The Effects of Insolvency

There are, however, several factors which may lessen the
differential in deterrence between the two systems. First, for
the purposes of the discussion above, it was assumed that all
defendants would be solvent. This is frequently not the case.
In many securities actions, the major participant in the fraud is
defunct or unable to fully respond in damages. Minor participants know this, and also know that under the rules of joint
and several liability they will be responsible for any portion of
the judgment which the major participant is unable to pay. If
there is any chance that the major defendant will become insolvent, the magnitude of damages presented to the minor
defendant will be all of the damages. Even under the proportional reduction system, minor defendants will thus be deterred by the possibility of being forced to pay for damages
attributable to an insolvent co-defendant. This prospect will be
present in both systems of judgment reduction and will thus
reduce any difference in deterrence which may exist between
the approaches.
5.

The Effects of Insurance

The above hypotheticals do not take into account the
effects of insurance. It is unclear what proportion of damages
are likely to be paid by insurers, but the insulating effect of
insurance and other legal obstacles to personal liability are
likely to reduce the deterrent effect of either system of settlement offset.
6. Efficiency
The hypotheticals also assume that the system is efficient,
and that the jury will thus properly allocate damages under the
proportional reduction rule. The reliability of this allocation,
however, is called into question in section IV(D)(2) below. The
prospect of inaccurate allocation of damages is likely to reduce
the difference in deterrence which may exist between the two
rules.
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Deterrence and Retribution

Deterrence should not be confused with retribution. Retribution involves allocating punishment (here damages) in proportion to the fault of the respective wrongdoers. Deterrence
is the threat of harm which should deter actors from engaging
in violations.
The proportional reduction rule is more effective in meting out retribution. The rule, after all, is the culmination of a
trend toward fair division of fault among joint tortfeasors, and
a main purpose of the rule is to prevent defendants from foisting their liability onto others through the tactic of an early
settlement. The pro tanto rule, however, is more effective at
deterrence because it presents each defendant with the threat
of being excluded from an early settlement and thus being left
to pay for damages caused by someone else.
B.

The ProportionalReduction Rule Discourages Settlement

The primary purpose of a settlement bar rule is to promote settlement by allowing one co-defendant to escape the
litigation completely when he settles with the plaintiff. The
Kaypro court claimed that the proportional reduction rule satisfies this "policy goal of encouraging settlement"'7 8 because
"defendants that are inclined to settle may do so without penalty or risk."'"
This conclusion presents only a portion of the picture. It
ignores the fundamental fact that it takes more than one party
to settle. While the Kaypro approach may allow a defendant to
settle, it provides serious settlement disincentives for the plaintiffs and non-settling defendants.
This section will discuss the effect of the proportional
reduction rule from the perspective of the settling defendant,
the non-settling defendant, and the plaintiff. The section concludes that while an incentive remains under that rule for defendants to settle, the proportional reduction scheme makes
non-settling defendants less inclined to settle and affirmatively
discourages plaintiffs from settling. This section then suggests

178. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1987).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
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methods of making settlement more attractive for the plaintiffs
under the proportional reduction rule.
1. The Settling Defendant
The proportional reduction rule meets the basic needs of
the settling defendant: the court enters a contribution bar
order which frees the defendant from the action. Indeed, under the Kaypro scheme, the settling defendant is even spared
the trouble of proving that the settlement was reached in good
faith. Under federal cases which adopt the pro tanto approach"8 and under the California system, 8' a "good faith"
hearing is held. This can require a major litigation effort, especially when the non-settling defendant challenges the good
faith of the settlement. As the court in Kaypro noted, "in order
to be truly efficacious, the good faith hearing would require a
full evidentiary hearing on all of the parties' relative
culpabilities."" Under the proportional reduction rule, the
settling defendant can, for the most part, buy its peace without
facing this time-consuming and expensive procedural obstacle.
Settlement therefore remains attractive to defendants.
2.

The Non-Settling Defendant

The proportional reduction rule gives the remaining,
non-settling defendants much less incentive to come to the bargaining table than the pro tanto approach. Under the latter,
when one defendant settles, he leaves the remaining defendants responsible for any inadequacy in the settlement. In
Nucorp, for example, the non-settling defendants argued that
the settlement left them to pay hundreds of millions of dollars
in damages caused by the settling defendants.' Each partial
settlement thus increases the exposure of the non-settling defendants and increases the pressure on those defendants to settle, lest they be left alone to face a trial and possible liability
forall of plaintiffs remaining damages.'

180.
181.
182.
183.
1987).
184.

See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (Deering 1991).
Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1230.
In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Lidg., 661 F. Supp. 1403, 1405-06 (S.D. Cal.
See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
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The proportional reduction rule sharply reduces the risk
the non-settling defendant faces by taking the case to trial.
Under that rule, the trial gives the non-settling defendant two
chances to avoid liability: (1) he can refute the plaintiffs' claims
and (2) he can argue that if there is any liability, the jury
should assign a large portion of it to the defendant who settled. Chances that the latter argument will succeed are magnified by the fact that the settling defendant will often not be
present or represented at the trial. Contrary to the assumption
in Kaypro, settlement pressures on defendants are greatly lessened by the proportional reduction rule and settlements (especially partial settlements) are made correspondingly less
likely.
3.

The Plaintiff

Kaypro's claim that the proportional reduction rule will
promote settlements is at its weakest when applied to plaintiffs. The rule makes it extremely risky for plaintiffs to enter
into partial settlements and, since partial settlements are an
important means by which judges simplify or eliminate securities cases, the proportional reduction rule may severely limit
the number of cases which will be settled.
The pro tanto system minimizes the risks plaintiffs face in
accepting a partial settlement. Even if they accept too small an
amount from the settling defendant, plaintiffs remain free to
collect all the rest of their damages from the non-settling defendants. Under the pro tanto rule, the risks of settlement are
thus placed on the party who is not involved in the settlement,
the non-settling defendant. When the settlement is too cheap,
this non-settling party is left to pay an inordinate percentage of
the damages after trial.
Part of the appeal of the proportional reduction rule is
that it shifts the risk of a bad settlement to a party who is involved in the settlement, namely, the plaintiff. Plaintiff decides
how much to accept from the settling defendant and assumes
the resulting risks. If the jury later decides that the settling
defendant was responsible for a greater percentage of fault
than plaintiff anticipated, plaintiff will be the loser when this
percentage is deducted from his recovery against the other
defendants. Courts have found this placement of risk attractive
not only because the risk falls on a party to the agreement, but
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also because it gives the plaintiff the "incentive to obtain a
'good' settlement and to secure from each settling defendant a
"
share of damages proportionate to fault. "
In many cases, however, the risks imposed by the proportional reduction rule may be too great for the plaintiff to take.
Following are the specific effects this rule may have in discouraging settlement.
a. Plaintiffs Will Hesitate to Settle Claims Which Are
Difficult to Estimate
Plaintiffs will be discouraged from settling with defendants
whose fault is difficult to estimate because any error in
plaintiffs' calculations will be deducted from the recovery
against the remaining, non-settling defendants. Cases where
comparative liability or damages are uncertain or difficult to
gauge will thus be less likely to settle.
b. Settlement with Impecunious Defendants or for Policy
Limits Will Be Severely Discouraged
Plaintiffs will also be discouraged from settling with any
defendant who cannot afford to pay his full proportion of fault
because any shortfall in plaintiffs' recovery from such defendants will be deducted from plaintiffs' recovery from the other
defendants.
This factor may forestall a great number of settlements.
Major defendants in securities cases are often insolvent or
nearly so. One practice has been for the plaintiff to settle with
such defendants first, accepting whatever funds they can pay.
Plaintiffs can then use this recovery to fund the remaining
litigation and to provide a partial recoupment of plaintiffs'
losses. In many cases, a defendant's only asset is an insurance
policy with liability limits which are significant but far less than
plaintiffs' damages, and plaintiffs often settle with impecunious
defendants by accepting their policy limits.
The proportional reduction rule makes this type of settlement nearly impossible. Under this rule, plaintiffs will never
want to settle with major defendants for less than their propor-

185. Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 552-53 (D. Colo. 1989); In
ae Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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tional share of damages, even if the defendants are offering
every cent they, and their insurance companies, can muster.
The chilling effects of the proportional reduction rule are
exemplified by Nucorp. There, plaintiffs, whose "baseline" damages were $230 million, entered into a $41 million
insurance-sponsored settlement with the "insider" defendants. " In approving this settlement, the court noted that if
the case went to trial against the "insider" defendants, "it is
entirely possible that the proof which establishes the liability of
the inside directors may also exempt their wrongful acts from
coverage under the terms of the polices and prevent [the policies] from covering the acts of any of the directors and officers.""" The settlement thus locked in insurance coverage
that otherwise might not have been available to the injured
plaintiffs. The judge approved the settlement, entered an order extinguishing contribution rights against the settling party,
and gave the non-settling defendants credit for the settlement
on a pm tanto basis." Under this ruling, the plaintiffs thus
received the $41 million settlement from the "insider" defendants and were free to collect the remaining $189 million in
damages from the "deep pocket" defendants after trial. 9
If the proportional reduction rule had been in effect, such
a settlement would have been unlikely. Thus, assume that
plaintiffs entered into the same insurance-sponsored $41 million settlement with the "insider" defendants, and that at trial
plaintiffs were able to prove their case against all defendants
and that their damages were, in fact, $230 million. Assume
also that, under the proportional reduction rule, the jury attributed 80% of the fault to the settling "insider" defendants
(these defendants would not be parties to the trial and, having
settled, would have no great incentive to defend their actions
there). Under these assumptions, plaintiffs' recovery against
the non-settling defendants would be $230 million, reduced by
the 80% of fault attributable to the settling defendants, leaving
a recovery of $46 million. Added to the $41 million received in
settlement, plaintiffs' total recovery would be $87 million of
the $230 million of damages they suffered.
186. Nucop, 661 F. Supp. at 1409.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1405-06.
189. d. at 1409.
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Under the proportional reduction rule, plaintiffs would
have had a much more favorable result if they had elected not
to settle with the "insider" defendants and instead forced all
the defendants to trial. If plaintiffs had done so and had
proved the same damages and liability against defendants,
plaintiffs would have been able to recover their entire $230
million from any, or all, of the defendants.
The proportional reduction scheme thus ignores the economic factors which influence settlement decisions. If a defendant has great liability but limited assets, continuing the litigation against him is a waste of plaintiffs' resources. Under the
proportional liability rule, however, plaintiffs will be forced to
keep culpable but impecunious defendants as parties to ensure
full recovery.
There will, of course, be some cases which settle under
this rule. In some instances, plaintiffs will be able to reliably
gauge a defendant's portion of fault and will feel comfortable
in accepting this amount, with some discount for settlement.
In other cases, a defendant's proportion of fault may be so
minor that plaintiffs' miscalculation of that portion will not
pose too great a threat. In still other cases, plaintiffs may be so
desperate for cash that they will settle with a defendant and
take their chances that their final recovery against the
non-settling defendants will be reduced by an unknown
amount. In many cases, however, the uncertainties inherent in
the proportional reduction rule will prevent the plaintiffs from
settling.
c. Delay of Settlement
Furthermore, the proportional reduction rule may delay
the settlements which it does not prevent entirely. Plaintiffs
will feel constrained to do the discovery necessary to establish
whether the prospective settling defendant is a major or minor
player and what percentage of damages he should be obliged
to pay. Early settlements will thus be discouraged, and, as
plaintiffs conduct the discovery necessary to establish the factual basis necessary for an informed settlement decision, their
costs will rise, as will the amount they must demand to economically settle the case. Settlements which do occur can thus
be expected to come later and be more costly.
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d. Empiical Evidence
There is some evidence that where the proportional reduction rule has been applied, the number of settlements has decreased. In 1974, New York adopted a proportional reduction
rule for all civil cases."m Although it is difficult to accurately
assess the number of partial settlements, 9 ' the consensus
among the commentators is that this scheme has reduced the
number of settlements. ' " The risks to the plaintiff of a partial
settlement, as described above, are considered to be too
great.'"

190. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 provides:
Release or covenant not to sue:
(a) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors.
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or more persons liable or claimed to be
liable in tort for the same injury, or the same wrongful death, it does
not discharge any of the tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, but it reduces
the claim of the releasor against the other tortfeasors to the extent of
any amount stipulated by the release or he covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the
released tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules, whichever is the greatest.
(b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the
injured person to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules.
(c) Waiver of contribution. A tortfeasor who has obtained his
own release from liability shall not be entitled to contribution form
any other person.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1991).
This section reduces the judgment by the amount of the settlement or the
amount of the settling defendant's equitable share, whichever is greater. This prevents a windfall recovery to plaintiffs in cases where the settling defendant pays a
large amount in settlement and the court then attributes a smaller than expected
share of fault to the settling defendant. See supra note 81.
191. Perry A. Carbone, Comment, Repealing New York's Post- Settlement Equitable
Share Reduction Sceme: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 49 ALB. L REv. 856, 859-60
n. 15 (1985).
192. See Samuel L. Green, General Obligations Law Section 15- 108: An Unsettling
Law, N.Y. STATE BAR JOURNAL, Oct., 1983, at 28,("[A]lthough the legislature believed that [New York General Obligation Law 15-108] would facilitate settlements,
almost a decade of experience has revealed that it produces precisely the opposite
result.").
193. Several commentators have discussed this issue. See, e.g., Joseph Kelner &
Robert S. Kelner, Unsettling Settlement, N.Y. Aw JOURNAL, July 10, 1985, at 1, 16
("[New York General Obligations Law Section 15-108] in its present form actually
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4. Class Action Settlements May Be Discouraged
Under the proportional reduction rule, a settlement is
always risky for the plaintiffs because they can never be sure of
its consequences. While the plaintiffs know the dollar amount
they will receive, they do not know the true cost of the settlement until trial, when the jury determines the percentage of
the fault attributable to settling defendants. Such uncertainty
may be reasonable in a typical lawsuit where the individual
plaintiff is responsible for protecting only his own interests
and is theoretically free to absorb any risks he chooses in connection with the settlement.'" In a class action, however, the
stakes are different, as most of the plaintiffs do not participate
in the litigation on a regular basis and have no means of assessing the adequacy of the settlement.'"
Since the proportional reduction rule makes the good
faith hearing unnecessary, the only court review of a partial
settlement required in a class action" is that required by
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court .... "

operates to discourage settlements in that it places litigants at more risk than they
are willing to assume." (quoting Carolyn D. Gentile, chair of the New York State
Law Revision Commission)); see also, Green, supra note 192, at 29 ("A maxim is
now prevalent among the plaintiff's bar in multi-party litigation: Settle with every
defendant, or settle with no defendant.").
194. Alvarado Partners v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 553 (D. Colo. 1989).
195. The Manual for Complex Litigation recognizes that:
The fairness of partial settlements may be particularly difficult
to assess. Because . . . the adequacy of the settlement depends in
part upon the relative exposure of the other parties . . . this assessment may be almost impossible to make if discovery is incomplete or
has been conducted against only a few of the defendants.
Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.46 West 1985). See also Sylvia R.
Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pre-TrialSettlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1985).
196. Many cases brought under the federal securities laws are class actions.
Indeed, it is federal policy to encourage the use of the class action device in securities cases. "In a securities case, the requirement of Rule 23 should be liberally
construed in favor of class actions." In re United Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 122
F.R.D. 251, 253 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub. nom, Wasserstrom v. Einsenberg, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
197. FED. R. CIw. P. 23(e).
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While courts generally hold hearings before approving a
class action settlement, a Rule 23(e) hearing does not determine whether "the proposed settlement [is] fair in light of the
comparative liability of the settling defendants."' Without
this information, neither the court nor the absentee plaintiffs
have any way of estimating the consequences of settlement
under the proportional reduction rule.
The proportional reduction rule causes notice problems as
well. Rule 23(e) provides that notice of a proposed settlement
"shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."'" The point of the notice requirement is
to "protect absent class members against prejudice from discontinuance of litigation brought on their behalf."' Under
the proportional reduction rule, however, it is very difficult to
give effective notice because it is impossible to predict the
consequences of the settlement before trial.2'
Drafting a notice which "fairly presents the merits" of the
settlement also causes practical problems for the class attorney.
If an attorney's optimistic view of the effect of the settlement
is not vindicated by the final judgment, the attorney may risk
exposure to a malpractice action. If an attorney frames a notice that presents too pessimistic a view of the effect of the
settlement, that lawyer runs the risk that individual class members will seek to have the settlement rejected.
The proportional reduction rule may, therefore, severely
discourage settlement of class actions.
5.

Methods to Neutralize Risk to the Plaintiff

In order to spread the risk of settlement among the parties, plaintiffs may attempt to enter into sliding scale agreements with settling defendants. Typically, in a sliding scale
agreement, one defendant will pay plaintiff a certain amount

198. Kirkorian v. Borelli, 695 F. Supp. 446, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
200. 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS 504-05 (1985).
201. As the court noted in the case of In re Atlantic Fin. Management Inc.
Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1028 (D. Mass. 1988): "Particularly in class actions
this [proportional reduction] method generates significant practical difficulties as
well, in that the indeterminate impact of any partial settlement would make it difficult to frame a notice to the class which fairly presents the merits of the proposed settlement."
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in settlement and will guarantee a further payment if plaintiff's
actual recovery from the other defendants is less than expected. Thus, in the proportional reduction rule setting, the settling defendant would make an initial payment to plaintiff and
would agree to pay more if the plaintiff's recovery at trial is
small because the jury attributes a large percentage of fault to
the settling defendant. Thus, the less the plaintiff recovers
from the non-settling defendants, the more the settling party
will have to pay the plaintiff, up to the limit of the
guarantee.' Under such a sliding scale agreement, the risk
of misjudging the settling defendant's degree of liability is

2
shared between the plaintiff and settling party.
The plaintiff and settling defendant will negotiate these
agreements, which will only be signed in cases where plaintiffs
have enough bargaining power to induce the settling defendant to make the sliding scale guarantee. Plaintiffs will not get
such a guarantee for free. They can expect to receive less cash
from the settling defendant because they are receiving the
value of the guarantee instead.
Finally, the most tangible effect of a sliding scale agreement may be seen at trial, where the settling defendant will
have every incentive to prove his innocence so that he will not
have to make any payment under the guarantee. Unlike most
trials conducted under the proportional reduction rule, the
settling defendant will be present and will actively defend his
actions.

202. The general principle of "Mary Carter" or sliding scale settlements is first
discussed in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
203. One commentator has noted:
Settling parties may find Mary Carter agreements very attractive in
comparative contribution jurisdictions, because the settling defendant's
negligence only reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of
fault attributed to him. The settling parties attempt to decrease the
settling defendant's percentage of liability, while increasing both the
total judgment and the non-settling defendant's percentage of fault.
Because the plaintiff has agreed that he will not require the settling
defendant to pay more than the amount set in the agreement, he will
execute against the settling defendant only to the amount to jury has
attributed to him. In terms of actual damages paid, the non- settling
defendant is thus likely to pay more, and the settling defendant less,
than their allocated percentage.
John E. Benedict, Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87
COLuM. L. REv. 368, 375 (1987).
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To summarize, under the proportional reduction rule, the
risks of settlement are heightened to such a degree that
plaintiffs will refuse many settlements, especially those with
impecunious major defendants or defendants whose share of
liability is difficult to predict. While a plaintiff can lessen this
risk by demanding a sliding scale guarantee, he may not have
enough bargaining power to obtain such a guarantee. If he
does obtain the guarantee, his cash recovery from the settling
defendant will be somewhat less.
C.

The Proportional Reduction Rule Does Not Promote Judicial

Economy
1. Elimination of the Good Faith Hearing
Another purported advantage of the proportional reduction rule is that it saves court time,' by eliminating the need
for a "good faith" hearing.' The basic inquiries at such a
hearing are whether the settlement is tainted by fraud or collusion and whether the settling defendant paid his proper share
of damages. The difficulties inherent in making this determination before trial have been the subject of much criticism.'
No matter when the hearing occurs, it poses problems. If
the settlement and hearing occur early in the litigation, before
the completion of discovery, it may be difficult for the settling
party to prove that the settlement was fair. If the partial settlement is reached later in the lawsuit, the non-settling defendant
may have to reveal defense strategy and evidence to show the
unfairness of the settlement.

204. This is the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Franklin v. Kaypro Corp.,
884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989). Interestingly, one legal commentator has suggested
adoption of a proportional reduction type rule without elimination of the good
faith hearing requirement. See Davis, supra note 7, at 1277.
205. See In weSunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1259- 60 (E.D. Pa 1988);
see also Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1985).
206. In Donovan, 752 F.2d 1170, the court noted that conducting a hearing:
means bogging down the settlement process in a miniature trial before trial, for "in determining good faith the court could consider the
risk of victory or defeat, the risk of a high or low verdict, the unknown strengths and weaknesses of the opponent's case, the inexact
appraisal as to the elements of danger, the defendant's solvency and
the amount of insurance coverage."
Id. at 1181 (citation omitted).
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Elimination of this troublesome hearing would appear to
save a good deal of time for both court and counsel. However,
the time-saving benefits of this approach may be illusory. Although the proportional reduction rule obviates the need for a
good faith hearing prior to trial, it does not eliminate the need
for the court to determine the issue that would have been
adjudicated by the good faith hearing, i.e., whether the settlement was, in a general sense, proportional to the settling
defendant's fault. Rather, by requiring the jury to find the
settling defendant's percentage of fault, the proportional reduction rule "pushes the same issues forward into an already
complex and confusing trial."'
Indeed, rather than reducing the scope of judicial inquiry,
the rule transforms what could be a summary determination
before a judge into an issue for full trial before a jury. Under
this scheme, the precise percentage of the fault of the settling
defendant, who is no longer a party to the action, is subject to
full proof at trial. As one trial judge has noted, "in a complex
securities litigation, the burden of the jury's time and perception is already considerable. To add to this burden the task of
apportioning fault between absent and present defendants
would obviate much of the advantage of partial settlement to
the judicial system itself."'

2. Pendent Claims
Any time-saving benefits of eliminating the good faith
hearing may be outweighed by the difficulty of dealing with
pendent claims which may be subject to a differing state law
1
judgment reduction rule.' The court in Nelson v. Bennet
viewed this as a minor problem:
[P]ractical difficulties in application will arise not in the
majority of cases, but only in those particular instances
where (1) both state and federal claims are asserted in a
single action, (2) the state provides a settlement bar stat-

207. In awAtlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. iUtig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1018
(D. Mass. 1988).
208. Id.
209. For a general discussion of the availability of pendent claims under the
securities laws see Lewis D. Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities
Ad, 67 COLUM. L REv. 474 (1967).
210. 662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
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ute, and (3) the state statute and the federal statute vary
significantly. In all other instances, the application of a
federal settlement bar rule presents no practical difficulties
2
whatsoever. "
The Nelson court, however, understates the problem. Pendent claims are common in securities actions. Due to the availability of punitive damages21 2 and a lower standard of culpability, state law claims are often very attractive to injured investors. Plaintiffs' lawyers may, therefore, feel obliged to include
pendent state law claims in most securities fraud actions. Moreover, plaintiffs who wish to avoid the harsh effect of the proportional reduction rule may file pendant state law claims in
states where the more attractive pro tanto rule will apply to
these claims.
The difference between the federal and state judgment
reduction rules makes pendent claims difficult for both the
judge and jury to handle. Consider the following example. P, a
resident of California, files a federal complaint under Rule
10b-5 against defendants SD and NSD. Plaintiff also asserts a
pendent claim for common law fraud, based on identical facts,
against the same defendants. The lOb-5 action would be governed by the federal proportional reduction rule while the
common law fraud action would be governed by the pro tanto
rule of the State of California.
Under these facts, while there would be no need to hold a
pretrial good faith hearing on the federal cause of action, California law requires that such a hearing be held as to the state
claim. 23 At that hearing, the judge would be required to summarily determine which portion of the settlement is attributable to the state cause of action. Given that the same facts will

211. Id. at 1337.
212. The federal securities statutes do not provide for punitive damages. 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-78111 (1978). The proof of a state punitive damage claim and a violation of the securities laws may be similar. A claim for punitive damages requires
willfulness; most claims for securities fraud require proof of scienter. See Ernst
and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
213. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (Deering 1991) provides:
Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties
are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt, shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged
tortfeasors or co-obligors.
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likely give rise to both the state and federal causes of action,
this determination would be largely conjectural. The judge
would then have to determine whether the settlement attributis within settling defendant's
able to the state cause of action
214
liability.
of
range
reasonable
As the case proceeds to trial, the practical problems would
be shifted to the jury. Presumably, it would have to determine
the total amount of damages and apportion these damages
between the federal and state claims. Again, this apportionment would be difficult, since the proof of the two claims
would be virtually identical. The jury would then need to determine the settling defendant's percentage of fault on the
federal claim alone and reduce the federal component of the
verdict by that percentage.
The difficulty of the jury's task would be increased by the
fact that, in order to maximize recovery, the plaintiffs, who do
not benefit under the proportional reduction rule, will want
the settling defendant's liability to be shifted to the state claim.
In contrast, non-settling defendants would argue that their
liability is under the federal claim because this liability will be
reduced more significantly under the proportional reduction
rule. There may be a heated debate at trial over defendant's
liability and damages, and the non-settling defendant's liability.
Additionally, the debate may include what portion of damages
should be assigned to which claims. Given this added debate, it
is not clear how the proportional reduction rule serves the
goal of judicial economy.
D. The ProportionalReduction Rule Places Heavy Burdens on the
Plaintiff
The proportional reduction rule is intended to produce a
fair division of liability among tortfeasors by ensuring that
each defendant pays damages according to his or her degree
of culpability.1 5 In fact, these goals may be undermined by
the elimination of the good faith hearing and the absence of

214. See Tech-Bit, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 698 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1985).
215. In Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989), the
Ninth Circuit concludes that the proportional reduction rule satisfies the "goal of
equity."
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the settling defendant at the trial where his liability is determined.
1. Plaintiffs Are Deprived of Settlement Leverage
With the elimination of the good faith hearing,1 there
is no judicial means of determining whether the amount paid
by the settling defendant bears any relationship to that
defendant's "fair share" of damages.1
Plaintiffs, of course, always have an incentive to obtain the
most lucrative settlement possible from the settling defendant,
and under the proportional reduction rule this incentive is
increased because plaintiff knows that he bears the risk of a
"cheap" settlement. However, for this incentive to be meaningful, the plaintiff and the settling defendant must be in comparable bargaining positions. Oftentimes, this is not the case. In
fact, plaintiffs may accept a small settlement because they need
the money or wish to simplify the litigation.
At a good faith hearing held under the pro tanto rule, the
non-settling defendants will object to any settlement that is too
cheap, and the threat of such an objection will give plaintiffs
bargaining leverage to obtain larger settlements from the settling defendant. Under the proportional reduction scheme,
plaintiffs receive no such bargaining leverage and an impecunious plaintiff is free to settle with a defendant for next to
nothing. In cases where the plaintiffs are desperate, the proportional reduction rule thus provides no guarantee that the
settling defendant will pay anything approaching his fair share
of the damages.
2. Juy Confusion and Prejudice to Plaintiff
One criticism of the California style good faith hearing is
that the judge must make some determination of the sufficiency of the settlement payment without the benefit of trial. Un-

216. See, e.g., Tech-Bit, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 698 P.2d 159 (Cal.
1985); see also Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987).
217. In securities class actions, there would be some inquiry into the fairness
of the settlement under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(e), but "the
different nature of the two proceedings does not allow a finding that a 'fair' settlement was obtained under Rule 23(e) to be used as conclusive proof that a setding defendant has paid its proper share of damages relative to the non-settling
defendants in an action for contribution." Smith, 827 F.2d at 562.
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der the proportional reduction rule, the determination of relative fault is made at trial, presumably with more evidence at
hand. Proponents of the proportional reduction rule argue,
that it results in a more accurate allocation of
therefore,
218
fault.
In fact, however, the trial will be skewed in fundamental
ways. It will include a determination of the liability of the settling defendant, which may have little relevance to the trial of
plaintiff's claim against the non- settling defendants. The settling defendant, who is in the best position to litigate his or
her own liability, will have been dismissed from the action and,
in most cases, will not be present or represented at the trial.
The plaintiff will, therefore, be placed in the awkward position
at trial of taking on the settling defendant's role in addition to
its own. It is easy to see how these contradictory roles could
make the plaintiff appear deceitful.
For example, consider the case where the liability of the
settling defendant and the liability of the non-settling defendant rests on the same set of facts and very similar conduct.
To optimize his recovery, plaintiff must vigorously attack the
conduct of the non-settling defendant while attempting to
minimize very similar conduct by the settling defendant (who
has been dismissed from the litigation)." Plaintiff's apparently two-faced position will be doubly confusing to a jury which
has not been informed of the circumstances of the settlement
and has no means of placing plaintiffs apparently selective
prosecution into perspective or of scrutinizing the evidence
presented at trial in the context of the true interests of the
parties.

218. Davis, supra note 7, at 1253-55.
219. See Mielcarek v. Knights, 375 N.Y.S.2d 922, 926 (1975):
After partial settlement of a case under New York General Obligations Law section 15-108, see supra notes 172-75 and accompanying
text, "the 'true adversary' .. . is not the settling tortfeasor with no
monetary interest or substantive liability, but the plaintiff who will
seek to prove that the settling tortfeasor was only slightly at fault and
that the greatest percentage of fault should be attributed to the nonsettling defendants."
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Problems of Proving the Case of an Absent Party

Moreover, the plaintiff will be required to present the
settling defendant's defenses without easy access to the necessary information or the ready cooperation of key witnesses.
Although the settling defendant may be called as a witness, he
or she will have no financial incentive to cooperate with the
plaintiff. The jury cannot judge the veracity of such a witness
accurately if it has no opportunity to know why he is not a
party to the action.
A main purpose of the proportional reduction rule is to
allow the settling defendant's liability to be determined at trial,
with the result that "the non-settling defendants never pay more
than they would if all parties had gone to trial."' While this
may occur, the above-described distortions of the adversarial
process may be quite prejudicial to plaintiffs. It is, therefore,
possible that the non-settling defendants will pay significantly
less than if all parties had gone to trial.
E. Conclusion
The purpose of the proportional reduction rule is to harmonize the goal of fairly allocating damages among defendants
with the goal of promoting settlement. The rule does succeed
in providing a fairer allocation of damages by removing the incentive for more culpable defendants to settle first and shift
their liability to the less liable non-settling defendants.
In other respects, however, the rule is not so successful.
While it allows a defendant to settle with the plaintiff and escape the action, it severely discourages plaintiffs from settling.
Significantly, it causes plaintiffs to reject settlements where
insolvent defendants offer every cent they and their insurance
companies can ever be required to pay.
In addition, while deterrence is a major goal of the securities laws, the rule decreases deterrence to a large class of actors, namely, minor participants in securities transactions. Similarly, while the purpose of settlement is to simplify the trial,

220. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added).
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the rule fails this purpose by keeping the liability of the setding defendant as an issue to be decided by the jury.
Finally, while the rule does allocate liability more fairly
than the pro tanto rule, its method of doing so, by means of a
trial at which the settling defendant is absent and the plaintiff
must put on a defense for that party, is so cumbersome and
skewed that any allocation of fault produced is likely to be far
less than exact.
Any attempt to harmonize the conflicting goals of fair
allocation of fault and promotion of settlement raises close
and difficult questions. Accordingly, the proportional reduction rule cannot be the "neat solution" it has been touted to
be. Its greatest weakness may be that, because it extinguishes
contribution rights which were explicitly created or implied by
Congress, its enactment is beyond the powers of the federal
courts.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In this section, a proposed solution to the problems raised
by the need for settlement bar rules in federal securities cases
is discussed. How courts can apply settlement bar rules consistently without exceeding their interstitial powers is discussed.
A.

Options For Courts
1. Courts Should Borrow Applicable State Laws Rules

In the absence of congressional action, courts which feel
that a settlement bar rule is necessary should turn to state law
first. Borrowing these rules from state law has two distinct
advantages.
First, the same rule will apply to federal and pendent
claims in any given case. The parties will, therefore, not be
tempted to attribute plaintiff's losses to one type of claim or
another in order to take advantage of the judgment reduction
rule which is most favorable to them.
Second, some states, including California and New York,
have specific statutory procedures and rules of court applicable
to settlement bar rules. These procedures are far more streamlined and developed than anything which the federal courts
could create using their interstitial powers. California, for example, has a statutory "good faith" hearing procedure which
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has been refined by judicial decision into a fairly efficient
means of determining whether a settlement bar order should
be entered."' Prior to Kaypro, some U.S. district courts had
adopted this California procedure on a de facto basis and it
worked fairly smoothly.
The main drawback in borrowing state law is the threat of
forum shopping. This threat is heightened by the fact that New
York and California (the two states which presumably spawn
the most securities actions) have very different settlement bar
rules. California has a pro tanto rule, while a proportional reduction rule is applicable in New York. However, it remains to
be seen whether the difference in settlement bar rules would
be sufficiently important to cause a California plaintiff, for
example, to bring his or her suit in New York. Moreover, forum shopping may pale in comparison to the intra-case claim
shopping which will occur if one settlement bar rule applies to
the federal claims and another applies to the state claims in
the same case. Finally, forum shopping will occur even if federal courts use their interstitial powers to create their own rules.
Until the Supreme Court finally decides the issue, the circuits
are likely to choose varying rules, and, thus, there will be forum shopping among the circuits.
Accordingly, borrowing of state law is not likely to lead to
a greater lack of uniformity than already exists. Borrowing will
cause more uniformity in any given case and will allow the
court to use relatively efficient, existing statutory systems, rather than cumbersome rules of the court's own making. Accordingly, if state settlement bar rules are applicable, federal courts
should borrow them.
2.

Options When No State Rule Is Available

Some states do not have applicable settlement bar rules.
As discussed above, a court's interstitial power is insufficient to
permit federal courts sitting is such states to create rules which
extinguish the congressionally created contribution rights of
such non-settling defendants. Courts must carefully design
settlement bar rules that do not deprive non-settling defendants of their statutorily created rights. Two proposals for such
rules follow.

221.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (Deering 1991).
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a. A Limited Pro Tanto Rule

Courts could create a pro tanto rule which extinguishes
contribution rights against a settling defendant only on a showing that the settling defendant had paid its full share of the
damages. Non-settling defendants have no rights to obtain
contribution from a settling defendant who has paid his full
share. An order extinguishing contribution rights under these
circumstances would, therefore, not deprive the non-settling
defendant of any significant rights and would fall within the
court's interstitial powers. Interestingly, this was the procedure
suggested by the Ninth Circuit prior to Kaypro. As noted in
Section II(G) above, the Ninth Circuit was presented with two
settlements which purportedly met this rigorous standard and
rejected both of them.' It is extremely difficult for a settling
defendant to make a pre-trial showing that he has paid his "full
share," and such a showing will be impossible in many cases
where the facts surrounding comparative liability are complicated. Therefore, this limited pro tanto rule is not likely to produce very many settlement bar orders.
b. A Limited ProportionalReduction Rule
The second option for courts which cannot borrow a state
settlement bar rule is to adopt the proportional reduction rule.
As discussed in section III(E), above, in most cases the proportional reduction rule does not deprive the non-settling defendant of its rights to contribution. On the contrary, at trial, the
non-settling defendant can argue to the jury, as he would in a
contribution action, that the settling defendant is responsible
for a part of plaintiffs damages. Subsequently, the non-settling
defendant will be relieved of the portion of damages attributable to the defendant who settled. In many cases the proportional reduction rule is within the interstitial powers of those
courts which have no state law alternative because it does not
deprive non-settling defendants of any substantive right. As
shown in section III(E), above, however, this is not true in
cases involving insolvent defendants. In such cases, the propor-

222. Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987); Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tional reduction rule may strip a non- settling defendant of his
rights to obtain contribution from perfectly solvent settling
defendants, leaving him, to pay huge damages caused by a
third, insolvent party.
Any judicially created proportional reduction rule will fall
within the court's powers only if it does not deprive
non-settling defendants of their rights to obtain contribution
on paying damages caused by an insolvent co- defendant. Since
insolvent parties are common in securities actions, such a rule
would seldom lead to effective settlement bar orders.
Judicial action, be it borrowing or creating settlement bar
rules, is not likely to produce any uniform national standard.
Accordingly, it is up to Congress to create such a standard.
The next section proposes, for discussion, a uniform settlement bar rule which Congress could enact to apply to settlements of all securities law cases.
B.

A Proposalfor a Settlement Bar System

The settlement bar systems discussed in this article share
one underlying flaw: Each system fails to give courts the flexibility necessary to make the partial settlement process fair.
Under Kaypro,=3 for example, courts must apply the proportional reduction rule in every case, even though it discourages
settlements, complicates trials and places heavy burdens on the
plaintiff. Under the pro tanto system (as it exists in California) a
court reviewing a settlement is given two choices, and in some
cases both of them will be unfair. First, the court can order a
pro tanto judgment reduction which, depending on the terms
of the settlement, may be horribly unjust to the non-settling
defendant. Alternatively, the court can reject the settlement
completely, which will complicate the trial and deprive the
injured plaintiff of a sure recovery.
The settlement bar system which this article proposes is
intended to give judges some needed flexibility by allowing
them to determine whether the pro tanto or proportional reduction rule should apply. This decision would be based on
the particular circumstances of each case. Under this proposal,
in cases where plaintiffs have induced the settling defendant to
pay a reasonable amount, plaintiffs will be rewarded by entry
223. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989).

19921

PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION RULE

of a pro tanto judgment reduction order. However, plaintiffs
who accept a settlement which is grossly inadequate will not be
entitled to the more favorable pro tanto judgment reduction: In
cases involving such a deficient settlement, the judge will apply
a modified proportional reduction rule. The details are as
follows.
First, a pretrial hearing will be held to examine the partial
settlement. If the settlement is not tainted by fraud, collusion
or an improper motive, the court will enter a settlement bar
order, extinguishing contribution claims against the settling
defendant. The court will then turn to the issue of which judgment rule to apply-the pro tanto rule or the proportional reduction rule.
At the hearing, the court will examine the amount to be
paid by the settling defendant. If this amount is within a reasonable range of the settling defendant's fair share of the damages, the court will order a pro tanto judgment reduction. In
making this decision, the court will consider the financial condition and insurance resources of the settling defendant. A
settlement which is otherwise inadequate will warrant a pro
tanto reduction if it represents the bulk of the settling
defendant's assets and insurance coverage.
Finally, if the settlement is not within a reasonable range
of the settling defendant's fair share of the damages, the court
will order judgment reduction according to the proportional
reduction rule. The percentage of fault attributable to the
non-settling defendant will be determined by the trial judge at
a post-trial hearing and this percentage will be deducted from
plaintiff s recovery.
This proposed rule is very similar to the system currently
in effect in California, with one significant change. As in California, a pretrial hearing would be held in which the court
would examine whether the settlement is tainted by fraud,
collusion or an improper motive 4 and whether the settlement amount is "not grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate
the settling defendant's liability to be.""5 As under the Cali-

224. For a discussion of improper motives, see Torres v. Union Pacific R.R.,
203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828-29 (Ct App. 1984).
225. I. at 832.
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fornia system, the court would consider the settling
defendant's financial condition and insurance coverage in deciding whether the settlement amount is "in the ballpark." The
proposed rule differs from the California system in that in
cases involving inadequate settlements, courts will have the
option of approving the settlement but applying the proportional reduction rule. The following sections explain the merits
of the proposed system.
1. FairSettlements Are Encouraged
The proposed system offers plaintiffs the incentive to
obtain a reasonable settlement from each defendant. If plaintiffs negotiate such a settlement, the pro tanto rule will be applied and, as explained in section IV(A)(1)(b) above, the risks
of that settlement will be passed from plaintiff to the
non-settling defendant.
2.

Settlements with Impecunious Defendants Are Encouraged

The proposed rule also permits courts to take economic
reality into account in determining whether the settlement is
reasonable. Courts will apply the pro tanto rule to a settlement
that might otherwise seem inadequate, if the settling defendant
is paying a sizable portion of his assets and insurance coverage.
The proposed system is thus superior to the proportional reduction rule, which encourages plaintiffs to reject settlements
with impecunious major defendants even where the proposed
settlement would give plaintiffs a greater recovery than they
would receive if they prevailed at trial and then tried to collect
a judgment. By applying the pro tanto rule in such situations,
the proposed system encourages, plaintiffs to enter into fair
settlements with impecunious defendants.
3.

Fairness to Non-Settling Defendants

The proposed system is also concerned with fairness to
the non-settling defendants. Before their contribution rights
can be extinguished, non-settling parties will be given a day in
court in which they will have the opportunity to prove that the
settlement is too cheap and, thus, leaves them exposed to paying an unreasonably large portion of the damages caused by
the settling defendant.
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4. The Proposed System Will EncourageJudges to Examine
Settlements Carefully
A major advantage of the proposed system arises in cases
where application of the pro tanto rule would be demonstrably
unfair to non-settling defendants. In such cases, judges will
have the option of rejecting the pro tanto rule without throwing
out the entire settlement. The proposed system is thus an improvement over the California system, where courts have only
the following two options when a non-settling defendant challenges the good faith of a settlement. First, the court can find
that the settlement is in good faith, in which case the settling
party is removed from the action, the trial is simplified and the
injured plaintiff receives immediate compensation. Second, the
court can reject the settlement, in which case the trial goes
forward with all defendants present and plaintiff receives no
sure recovery. Given these choices, the court's desire to simplify the case and ensure some recovery to plaintiffs will often
outweigh the non-settling defendant's claims that the settlement is unfair. The unfortunate result of the current California system is that the pro tanto rule may be applied to some
very dubious settlements.
The system proposed here spares judges this Hobson's
choice. The court is not required to decide between approving
or rejecting a settlement. Instead it decides which judgment
reduction rule should apply. Courts thus have an incentive to
weigh settlements carefully and to apply the proportional reduction rule in cases where application of the pro tanto rule
would be unfair to the non-settling defendant.
5. JudicialEconomy Will Be Served
Under the proposed rule, the pretrial hearing will not
place too great a burden on the judicial system. Similar hearings are held under the California system on practically a daily
basis and they are fairly short and streamlined and often are
decided on the basis of declarations.'
Nor will the trial be unduly complicated in cases where
the court applies the proportional reduction rule. The jury will

226. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(b) (Deering 1991).
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not be called upon to gauge the comparative fault of the settling and non-settling defendants. Rather, this will be done at a
post-trial hearing conducted by the trial court judge. Since this
judge will have heard all of the evidence in the case, this hearing should be neither too long nor too complicated.
Finally, the proposed rule will add some complexity by
requiring a pretrial hearing and post-trial hearing in those
cases where the judge selects the proportional reduction rule.
Even so, the proposed system will not be as complicated as
that proposed in Kaypro, which requires that the fault of the
absent, settling defendant be fully litigated at the trial of every
case involving a partial settlement.'*
6.

The Proposed System Does Not Lessen Deterrence Apprecia-

bly
The proposed system should retain the deterrent effect of
the pro tanto rule. As explained in section III above, under the
pro tanto rule minor defendants are deterred by the knowledge
that a major defendant may enter into a cheap, early settlement with plaintiff, leaving the minor defendant exposed to
paying the bulk of the damages. The proposed system, while
lessening it somewhat, retains this deterrent effect.
Thus, under this proposal, the prospect of the pre- trial
hearing will encourage the major defendant to pay a settlement price that is within a reasonable range of its fair share of
the damages. This range, however, can be quite broad, especially in cases involving impecunious defendants. Accordingly,
courts will apply the pro tanto rule to many settlements where
the settling major defendant pays only a fraction of his share
of the damages. Minor defendants will continue to be deterred
by the prospect of such settlements, which would leave them
to pay most of the damages caused by the major defendant.
Under the proposed rule, courts will apply the proportional reduction rule in cases where the settlement is unreasonably
low. Deterrence will therefore be decreased because minor
participants in securities transactions will know that this rule
provides them with some protection against being left "holding
the bag" if the victim enters into an unreasonably .cheap settlement with the major participant. As a policy matter, however,
227. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1231.
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deterrence should not rely on the threat of unreasonable settlements. The marginal decrease in deterrence under the proposed rule is the result of the fact that this rule will be fairer
in some cases. This increased fairness warrants the slight decrease in deterrence to a limited group of actors.
7.

The Nucorp Example

In examining the proposed solution, a final look at
Nucorp' will be helpful. There, the plaintiffs who suffered
"baseline" damages of $230 million accepted a $41 million
pretrial settlement from various "insider" defendants.' This
left the non-settling defendants, including accountants, bankers, and underwriters, exposed to the remaining liability of approximately $180 million. '
Applying the proposed rule to these facts, a judge would
first examine whether the settlement payment was reasonably
related to the settling defendants' fair share of the liability.
The answer to this question would have to be in the negative,
because the settlement allowed apparently primarily liable
"insider" defendants to escape the action by paying only 18%
of the damages, while the secondarily liable defendants were
left to pay the remaining 82%.
After making this determination, the court would examine
whether the settlement was fair in light of the settling
defendants' financial condition. This inquiry might lead to a
different result. In Nucorp, Judge Irving found that most of the
settlement payment came from the settling defendants' insurance policies."' Judge Irving also found that there was evidence that the settling "insider" defendants might have committed acts of dishonesty, which if exposed at trial, would not
be subject to coverage.' The settlement thus represented all
plaintiffs' insurance coverage and, if the matter went to trial,
this coverage might not have been available at all. m It was
not clear whether the settling defendants had other assets sufficient even to replace the insurance coverage in the event this

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
I at 1410.
Id.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
Id.
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coverage was lost. Assuming they did not, the settlement would
satisfy the rule proposed here, since the settlement price
would give plaintiffs a recovery equal to what they would receive if they tried to collect a verdict against the settling defendants. Accordingly, the pr tanto judgment reduction order
would be applied.
This would not be the result if the settling defendants had
significant assets. If that were the case, it would be unreasonable to leave minor defendants exposed to 82% of the damages when the major defendants were fully capable of paying for
all the harm they had caused. Under the proposed system, the
court could therefore apply the proportional reduction rule
and, after trial, plaintiffs' recovery from the non-settling parties
would be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the
settling defendants.
As mentioned, it is not clear from the record in Nucorp
what the assets of the settling defendants were, although the
non-settling defendants claimed that they were very substantial.' It is clear that Judge Irving felt intense pressure to approve the settlement for the purposes of streamlining a very
long, complex trial. Had the proportional reduction rule been
available to him, he might have imposed it, thereby allowing
the settlement to go forward while refusing to expose the
non-settling defendants to the prospect of shouldering 82% of
the damages.
8.

Criticisms of the Proposed Rule

Both plaintiffs and non-settling defendants can be expected to criticize the proposed rule.
Plaintiffs will argue for a pure pro tanto system, claiming
that application of the proportional reduction rule in any case
places too great a burden on them. The proposed rule, however, places this burden only on plaintiffs who agree to a settlement which is so unreasonable as to be "out of the ballpark."' Plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover the inadequacies of such demonstrably unreasonable settlements from
non-settling defendants.

234. Id.at 1410.
235. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 698 P.2d 159, 159-67 (Cal.
1985).
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Non-settling defendants will complain that the proposed
system protects them only from the patently unreasonable settlements. They will complain that in many cases the court will
approve a settlement which on its face may seem reasonable,
but which will prove to be wholly inadequate when an unexpectedly large verdict is entered. In such cases non-settling
defendants will be left to pay a huge share of the damages
caused by the settling defendant.
The proposed rule, however, gives sufficient protection to
the non-settling defendant. It gives them standing to challenge
any settlement and to show that it is unfair or that the settlement price is unreasonably low. It also gives courts a palatable
alternative in cases where the settlement does, in fact, appear
to be unreasonably cheap.
This is all that is due to the non-settling defendants. In
cases where these defendants are held to pay a
disproportionately large share of damages, they are at least
somewhat at fault, while the plaintiff-investor will often be entirely without fault. Moreover, officers, directors, accountants,
lawyers, and underwriters may be in a better position to insure
themselves against losses than are investors. Insurance against
such losses may be considered part of the cost of doing a type
of business from which a substantial profit is derived.
Given these considerations, courts cannot be expected to
mathematically tailor each defendant's liability to his or her
precise mathematical percentage of fault. The proportional
reduction rule is an attempt to apportion liability in this way.
Application of this rule in all cases is likely to prevent partial
settlements, lessen deterrence, lower recovery to plaintiffs, and
prolong and complicate trials.
While the trend toward fair allocation of damages is a
healthy one, the proponents of the proportional reduction rule
have taken this trend to an unfair extreme. Congress should
limit the applicability of this rule to only those cases where it is
appropriate and necessary.

